


UC-NRLF



\$B 15 966

U A  
647  
L 18



# THE BRITISH ARMY IN A EUROPEAN WAR

- I. A WEEK WITH THE TERRITORIAL FORCE
- II. THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1909
- III. THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

BY

GENERAL H. LANGLOIS

Formerly Member of the Higher War Council of the French Army

592  
JAN. 2nd 1910

TRANSLATED BY

CAPTAIN C. F. ATKINSON

First City of London (Royal Fusiliers)

LONDON

HUGH REES, LTD., 119, PALL MALL, S.W.

1910

*All rights reserved*

*Price 1/6 net.*



**THE BRITISH ARMY IN A  
EUROPEAN WAR**

Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2007 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation

# THE BRITISH ARMY IN A EUROPEAN WAR

- I. A WEEK WITH THE TERRITORIAL FORCE
- II. THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1909
- III. THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

BY

GENERAL H. LANGLOIS

FORMERLY MEMBER OF THE HIGHER WAR COUNCIL OF THE FRENCH ARMY

TRANSLATED BY

CAPTAIN C. F. ATKINSON

1ST CITY OF LONDON (ROYAL FUSILIERS)



LONDON

HUGH REES, LTD., 119, PALL MALL, S.W.

1910

*All rights reserved*

L18

TO VINU  
ALPHACILAO



cf.

## TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

THIS study of the British Army originally appeared in the *Revue Militaire Générale* in October and November, 1909, and has since been republished in pamphlet form by Messrs. Berger-Levrault and Co. The English translation, which is published by kind permission of that firm, has been approved by General Langlois.

The original articles were accompanied by a faithful reproduction, in five colours, of the Ordnance map of Salisbury Plain. As, however, the ground is well known, it has been decided, on the score of expense, to replace this by a sketch map of the particular area to which the author's tactical observations specially refer.

As an exposition of the views held in advanced military circles in France regarding the international significance of the British Army, Regular and Territorial; as a technical estimate of British military methods by one of the foremost of European soldiers; and, lastly, as a picture of the citizen soldiers' regimental existence, the peculiarities of which are more apparent to a foreign visitor than they can be to those who know no

other military atmosphere, this study will, it is hoped, be acceptable both to soldiers, professional and unprofessional, and to the thoughtful public, which, it would be idle to deny, is seriously concerned as to the outcome of the armed truce that everywhere prevails.

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION - - - -	9
I. A WEEK WITH THE TERRITORIAL FORCE - -	12
II. THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1909 - -	44
III. THE ENTENTE CORDIALE - -	75



# THE BRITISH ARMY IN A EUROPEAN WAR

## INTRODUCTION

BETWEEN two nations, an understanding is not an affair of sentiment, but of interests. It is born of a common danger, and imposes upon each of the contracting parties, not only absolute loyalty towards one another, but also duties, and therefore responsibilities, to be shouldered. This to-day is the situation of France and Great Britain. Pan-Germanism is not merely a general and unvarying menace to Europe, but a direct and special danger to these two countries—France, whose ports on the Channel and the North Sea excite ill-disguised desires; and England, the stern rival of German commerce and the possessor of colonies that arouse the jealousy of a people which is choking indoors.

It is true that the German Emperor seems absolutely sincere in his desire for a lasting peace, but the volume and violence of the Pan-Germanist party's war-cries show only too clearly the seriousness of the pressure to which he is being subjected by the people, and one may well ask whether he will not yield some day—especially if he sees the outlets for German expansion shut off one after the other.

The consequent identity of French and British interests has found expression in the *entente*

## 10 THE BRITISH ARMY IN A EUROPEAN WAR

*cordiale*,\* which is advantageous to both peoples, and is fortified to some extent by political sympathies. Indeed, nothing comes so near to true republican institutions as the Constitution of Great Britain, which so thoroughly safeguards the rights of the individual citizen.

Two questions consequently present themselves for consideration :

(a) From the French point of view, will Great Britain be in a position to give us—beside the support of her fleet, which would be of very little use to us in a war with Germany—a sufficient contingent of solid troops to co-operate with us on the Continent ?

(b) From the British point of view, does the *entente* with France provide a sufficient guarantee of safety, in case England enters the lists against Germany ?

This is the twofold question of which I desire to find the answer.

It is well known that the British forces at home comprise two distinct parts :

(a) The Regular Army, or “ Expeditionary Force”, of six infantry and one cavalry divisions, thoroughly solid and well-trained troops, well commanded, perfectly equipped—in short, remarkably fitted for Continental warfare.

(b) The Second Line Army, called the “ Territorial Force”, fourteen divisions. This is destined, in the absence of the Regular Army, to protect Great Britain against a possible invasion.

The first question set forth above will be answered if it can be shown that the Territorial Army suffices for its assigned task, as *ipso facto* this would set free the Regular Army for external action.

The study of the Territorial Army and its

\* General Langlois uses a still stronger phrase, “ *explique l'union des deux peuples* ”.—Tr.

military value, therefore, forms the very foundation of my inquiry. Further, although it would be more logical to begin by describing the reforms of the present War Minister, Mr. Haldane, and the British Army of to-day, and placing before the reader an outline of the intensely earnest discussion to which the new schemes have given rise, I reserve all these points until later, and for this reason :

A committee of the British Press, acting, perhaps, on a hint from high quarters, invited some military writers to visit England at the beginning of August, for the purpose of seeing the Territorial divisions, then assembling, at work. I accepted their invitation with pleasure, as also did Lieutenant-Colonel Rousset, and MM. Ardouin - Dumazet, Judet, Naudeau, and Reginald Kann ; and before entering upon a general discussion I think it would be well to describe, while my memory is still fresh, the days that we passed with the Territorial Army, and the impressions that those days made upon us.

## I.

# A WEEK WITH THE TERRITORIAL FORCE

It may be useful, first of all, to give a brief sketch of the organization of the Territorial Army.

Before the advent of Mr. Haldane at the War Office, the Second Line Army of England comprised—

1. The *Militia* and the *Yeomanry* (cavalry), “a sort of national guard serving about one month in each year.”\*

2. *Volunteers*, a national guard less well organized.

These *Auxiliary Forces*, recruited, like the rest of the army, by the system of voluntary enlistment, could not be called upon to serve abroad without their consent. They were a mass of units (battalions, squadrons, fortress batteries) without interconnection or general organization, without departmental services; an incoherent assemblage of different groups, in which the terms of service, liabilities, pay, and even regulations, differed from unit to unit; a force, lastly, the mobilization and employment of which would have involved almost insurmountable difficulties.

Mr. Haldane transformed the *Militia* into a *special reserve*, in which the men engaged to serve abroad [in war], and the purpose of which was to assure the rapid mobilization of the Regular Army, and its maintenance at full strength, during the first six months of a campaign. The special reserve, there-

\* *Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères* [published by the Second Bureau of the French General Staff].



fore, is now attached to the First Line Army, and we shall deal with it later.

The Volunteers were replaced by the *Territorial Army*, which was created [by Royal Assent to Act of Parliament] on August 2, 1907 [and by transfer of units of the Volunteers on April 1, 1908]. This force consists of fourteen divisions fully organized with all services, like the divisions of the Regular Army, and therefore susceptible of prompt mobilization. The *Yeomanry* constitutes the cavalry of the Territorial Army.

It was formed first of all from those of the old Volunteers who agreed to enter the new organization; and thereafter it has recruited in the usual way by voluntary engagements. Enlistment is for four years, the minimum age for recruits being seventeen, and the maximum thirty-five. The Territorial may re-engage up to the age of forty, and even, when holding certain ranks and appointments, up to fifty. The recruit is allowed to select his corps, and even the company, battery, etc., in which he desires to serve. As for training, the men of the Territorial Army are obliged to attend a certain number of weekly drills, and to spend two weeks annually in camp.

The Territorial Army comprises—

Fourteen *Cavalry Brigades*, each of 3 regiments, and a horse battery (about 30,000 men).

Fourteen *Infantry Divisions*, each of 3 infantry brigades (=12 battalions); 3 brigades of field artillery, each of 3 batteries; 1 brigade of howitzers (2 batteries); 1 heavy battery; 3 companies of engineers; and departmental troops (total about 360,000).

*Army Troops*—2 cavalry regiments, 8 telegraph companies, 1 balloon company.

Lastly, *Coast Defence Troops*.

The whole number of effectives authorized is 313,675 men.

The non-commissioned officers are largely drawn from old Volunteer non-commissioned officers, of whom many have seen active service. In addition a certain number are ex-non-commissioned officers of the Regular Army. Later, the non-commissioned ranks will be filled by re-engaged Territorials.

A considerable number of the officers come from the Regular Army, but the greater part are raised, by voluntary engagements, from the élite of the intellectual and practical classes—business men, professional men, lawyers, professors, etc., who have passed preliminary examinations and undergone a course of training with a [Regular] unit.

To insure the supply in the future, the War Minister has created the *Officers' Training Corps*, a nursery of future officers. In educational establishments analogous to our lycées, and also in the Universities, courses of military instruction have been established which the pupils may follow if they choose to do so, and in which they are organized in battalions and batteries under retired officers and non-commissioned officers of the Regular Army. These young volunteers have to attend drills and camp. At first sight this institution seems to resemble our own former "scholars' battalions", but there are two essential points of difference: the pupils who take the military course belong to the upper classes, and are destined to become officers; and they are trained not only in drill movements and the handling of arms, but also in field work, which they take seriously and do well.

Briefly, Territorial officers are to be recruited—  
 (a) Amongst young men of good standing, who have passed a special examination and been trained in a corps of troops for one year. (b) Amongst the junior or school members of the *Officers' Training Corps* who have obtained "Certificate A". This reduces the training period from twelve to eight months. (c) Among the senior or University

members of the same who have obtained "Certificate B". This reduces the training period to four months.\*

One of the happiest of Mr. Haldane's innovations is the creation of *County Associations*, which are composed of the most influential and wealthy men in each county. These associations have to organize and administer the Territorial troops raised within their area. They command, in some degree, the resources of the civil administration, can contract loans, accept gifts, etc. The result is an intercounty emulation which is fruitful of good, and a broad-minded way of administration that fosters initiative.

Lastly, *pro memoria*, we mention another eventual resource—the *Boy Scouts*, originated by General Baden-Powell. These are boys who place themselves voluntarily under a leader, and train themselves in open country in scouting, stalking, improvising tents, hasty bridges, etc., and field cooking. The basis of their moral training is solidarity, defined in the undertaking given by the lad on joining, to "do my best to help the others, whatever it may cost me".

*Sunday, August 1.*—The troops of one of the London Territorial divisions assembled to proceed to camp. We watched in the street the "fall-in" of three or four companies of a battalion, with its band. The men appeared on an average to be very young, some practically boys, these being men who joined after the formation of the Territorial Army. By the side of these youngsters there were a certain number—not many—of older men with Volunteer service. The men are rather small. They seemed to be gay, their movements smart and soldierly, and their attitude perfectly correct.

\* This has been left precisely as it stands in the original. It represents, as everyone knows, future aspirations rather than present practice.—Tr.

The non-commissioned officers are old hands; many of them wear on their breasts the ribbon of a war medal.

The officers were quite at ease in uniform. One felt that they had a real authority over their men, partly, perhaps, because of the higher rank that they occupy in society.

Everyone was in khaki field service kit—flat-topped cap with peak, frock with large and convenient pockets, putties. The equipment struck us especially; it is of twill, a cotton web both strong and supple, with tongueless buckles. No strap confines the chest, the weight is distributed on the shoulders most judiciously, and the whole load can be taken off or put on in a moment. The full load was being worn, except the cartridges and the entrenching tool.

The roll-call was properly taken, and the ranks were very orderly. The assembly was watched with interest by a crowd.

In fine, these troops made a favourable first impression on us.

Later in the morning a field battery passed us at the walk. The horses were all hired and heterogeneous. The teams were not well matched; some, especially amongst the near horses, were evidently exhausted, and ran with sweat, while the others were quiet and easy. The men seemed to us younger still than those of the infantry, and their seat on horseback very faulty. The bridle consists of bridoon and curb, the reins being fastened either to a ring, or in slots in the bit bars, more or less distant from the horse's mouth according to the pull required. As a rule the reins are fastened to the ring, and the rider thus drives on the bridoon rein—a useful precaution, given the obvious inexperience of the drivers.

When the battery first appeared, we thought it was a horse battery, as it included so many mounted

men. But these, it appears, were scouts and signallers. The number of these specialists is relatively considerable. The Territorial battery has four guns, while the Regular one has six.

No one stopped to look at the battery as it went by—in contrast with what we had just seen in the case of the infantry assembly.

*Monday, August 2.*—We went by motor-car to Salisbury Plain Camp, about eighty miles south-west of London. The ground is about the same in size as our Châlons Camp, which it greatly resembles in general aspect. By reason of the constant humidity of the climate, the grass of Salisbury Plain is rather more vigorous, and the trees are taller and stouter. In the southern part of the plain, where we were to watch the next day's work, the undulations are bolder than in the Châlons manœuvre-ground, and the tree-clumps of more varied sort.

In the eastern part of the Government ground, at Tidworth, an infantry brigade and a cavalry regiment of the Regular Army are permanently stationed in comfortable barracks. In the southern part, at Bulford, there is another barrack camp, for the use of the artillery, which comes there for its practice. On August 2 the camp contained in addition the two Territorial divisions of the City [and County] of London. Each division is commanded by a general officer, who is assisted by a very small staff of regular officers. The Regular Army, be it observed, furnishes no other element, whether combatant or non-combatant, commanding or staff officers. The Territorial Army does its work with its own resources alone.

In each division the troops were encamped in three fractions, some distance apart—two infantry brigades and the artillery, technical, and departmental troops together. The men and officers were housed in conical tents, each tent holding twelve soldiers, and all in very good condition. In

each camp there were a number of spacious double tents for the men's canteens, the non-commissioned officers' and officers' messes—the last-named luxuriously furnished. It was not uncommon to find a piano in the non-commissioned officers' messes and the canteens. So comfortable an installation for fifteen days' stay profoundly astonished us, in comparison with the poor equipment of our own permanent camps. Evidently it is sought to secure the good-will of the soldier, by giving him comforts which, in most cases, he does not get in his own home. Every effort is made to make 'camp' agreeable, and the effort is successful.

After lunch, to which we accepted the most courteous invitation of General Codrington (son of the former Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in the Crimea), we visited the camps of one of the divisions under the escort of two staff officers, who gave us all the necessary information and explanations with untiring good-will.

The division had all its administrative services complete—transport, supply, medical, and ammunition. The commissariat service was carried out partly by horsed vehicles, partly by mechanical transport of various kinds suitable to the duties required of it. All the vehicles and horses were hired. We saw a motor lorry, identical with those subsidized by the State in Germany, being used for the transport of forage. The tyres of all the motors are pneumatic without metal studs. It appears that when the grass is wet the wheels skid, and the vehicle is useless; on August 2, however, the ground was dry.

The auxiliary services seem to be very popular with men who are engaged in expert trades, etc., and are therefore easily recruited. The officers, themselves also experts, astounded us by their spirit of initiative, the results of which revealed themselves in all the details of the installation, as we

were to see for ourselves later on. In truth, in the Territorial Army there seems to be none of that administrative pother which makes the "services" so heavy, so slow, and so stiff, in many modern armies. The whole administration of the Territorial Force is entrusted to the "County Associations," composed of broad-minded business men, which, so far from killing initiative, encourage it. This initiative, the fruitful parent of activity, struck us forcibly; herein is the explanation of the fact that all this organization works so regularly, and with such an absence of jars or friction that our own army may well envy it. One feels, in taking a general view of this system, that the Territorial division is a self-contained whole, a large unit capable of meeting its own requirements in any circumstances, even the most difficult. And this first impression was only deepened by what we saw in the days following.

The medical service particularly attracted our notice. A man had just been rather seriously injured in the head by a fall from his horse, and we saw the stretcher-bearers and orderlies lift the wounded man into an ambulance waggon with remarkable skill and care. All these men come from the London hospitals, and were thoroughly trained. As for the medical officers, they are recruited from amongst the practitioners of the large towns. Some of the highest men in the profession do not scruple to leave their patients in other hands for a fortnight—that is, to forfeit considerable sums of money—in order to give their services to the country. Here, indeed, is one of the finest examples of the patriotic movement that, under the pressure of danger from abroad, is urging the British people into a rapidly maturing militarism.

After the "services," which won our genuine admiration, we went on to the artillery camp. The divisional artillery includes three brigades of three 4-gun batteries, a brigade of two howitzer batteries,

and one heavy field battery (naval guns—the Lady-smith “Long Toms”—converted into quick-firers). We watched the gun detachments of all these types under instruction. It must be remembered that the division had only assembled in camp the day before, and the men were therefore doing their first day’s outdoor work. Nevertheless the gun numbers—almost all mechanics, skilled labourers, or men belonging to special trades—soon grasped the drill, and were even able to deal with the minor hitches that always accompany firing practice.

Elsewhere we saw the young artillery drivers at riding drill. These were only beginners. They showed all the good-will in the world, and boldness as well, but their training is quite insufficient, and cannot be made up in a fortnight’s camp. A field battery was drilling, thus early, as a battery, and performing a movement in line at close interval at the walk. Some of the vehicles, whose teams jibbed, fell behind, horses got into trouble, and one of them (a near-horse) threw himself down. At such moments the extremely convenient arrangement of the traces greatly assisted the drivers, but nothing could make good their inexperience, and the only way to extricate the vehicles was for the senior non-commissioned officers to do everything themselves. It is impossible, in spite of the keenness of everyone, to train men and horses at the same time, for the latter were wholly unaccustomed to be ridden and driven, and further incommoded by their unskilful riders. In brief, the Territorial field artillery has not now, and will not for a long time be able to acquire, the manœuvring capacity which it should possess if it is to fulfil its mission.

We next visited the camp of one of the infantry brigades of the division. We arrived late, after the day’s operations were over and the evening meal done. Already nearly all the men, instead of resting, were indulging their national love of sport



in various ways—tennis, cricket, football, etc.—into which they threw an astounding ardour. These youths—town workmen, artisans, labourers, clerks, artists—who had seemed to us the evening before as somewhat weakly, now appeared in another aspect. They did not hesitate to round off their first day's work, which had been fatiguing, with violent exercise. Their stay in camp, so far from being a bore, they treat as a kind of holiday outing. They were happy and gay. The officers, indeed, do all they can to keep up this happy frame of mind by encouraging games, and especially by paying the expenses incurred. One Colonel gave his battalion a push-ball, which does not cost less than £16. Some young Territorials had put on their elegant walking-out dress, which is scarlet, and similar in pattern to that of the Regulars. They seemed to be exceedingly proud of it.

The sergeants were still at mess. They were comfortably installed and plentifully fed.

The officers' mess, where the officers of the brigade gave us tea and a charming welcome, was in a very large tent which was divided in two, one part serving as dining-room, the other as ante-room (*salon*). In the latter a thick soft carpet entirely covered the bare ground, and there were games of all sorts to help to while away the evenings.

In almost every officer's tent, and in a good many of those of the men, there was a *tub*, the inseparable accessory of English life.

We examined the cooking-places carefully. The regimental cooking staff draws daily for each man 1 pound of meat, 1 pound of bread, and 1s., the money being used not only to purchase additional food-supplies, but also to meet small expenses approved by the Commanding Officer. With such resources rations are copious, as we were able to see in the next few days. The Englishman prefers

his meat roasted as a rule, and the brigade had established field ovens. These consisted of a half-cylinder of metal closed at one end, and resting on the ground. It was covered with a thick layer of soil or turf. A wood fire is lighted in the inside, and then, when the wood is burnt out, plates containing the meat to be roasted are introduced in the usual baker's fashion, and the open end of the oven closed with an iron plate. For cooking the vegetables a long and narrow trench is dug in the ground, and covered with a large iron plate which is perforated by several holes, and upon which are set camp-kettles similar to our own. The iron plates are, it appears, carried in the regimental transport. This outfit is heavy, but it economizes time in the installation of field kitchens.

We inspected the infantryman's field equipment very closely, and saw how practical it was. All of us regretted that in France the Minister of War had not sanctioned the web equipment proposed by Colonel Bruson, which is simply the English equipment with improvements in details. There should still be time to cancel this decision, and I feel that I ought to insist with special earnestness that the manufacture of our bad leather equipment should be stopped at once. The English officers have still their leather belts, etc., and several of them told us that they were eagerly looking forward to the time when the web equipment as served out to the men should be given to them as well.

After visiting the camp, we spent the night at Salisbury, a delightful provincial town that captivated us all by its spotless elegance and its superb cathedral.

*Tuesday, August 3.*—Next day, August 3, there was a two-sided manœuvre (*manœuvre à double action*), a Regular infantry brigade against a Terri-

torial division (one which we had not seen in yesterday's visit) and an Officers' Training Corps division. The Territorial division had been in camp a week.

The *White* forces were: 1 infantry brigade of the Regular Army, 1 squadron of the Scots Greys—a cavalry regiment which has a high reputation—and 2 field batteries.

The *Brown* side was composed of 1 division of school corps (about 2,000 strong), 2 Territorial brigades (8 battalions), 1 brigade of Territorial field artillery, 1 brigade of Regular field artillery, [2 squadrons], 2 bridging companies and 1 telegraph company, Territorial engineers, and 2 Territorial field ambulances.

N.B.—The normal British battalion has 8 companies of 120 to 130 men each; in manœuvres the effective is 100 to 110 per company.

GENERAL IDEA.—1. A White army, based on Exeter, is advancing eastward against the Brown capital (London), after having driven back part of the Brown army near Ilchester on July 28.

2. The Brown army appears to have retired with a view to concentrating at some point east of the River Avon.

3. On August 1 the White army has reached the line of the Avon between Upavon (16 miles north of Salisbury) and Fordingbridge (south of Salisbury), and on August 2 it has made several attempts to cross the river between Amesbury (8 miles north of Salisbury) and Salisbury. About 4 p.m. a White detachment captured Old Sarum ( $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles north-north-west of Salisbury), which was occupied by a small Brown detachment.

4. About 5 p.m. another White detachment forced the passage of the river at Milston, and occupied Silk Hill.

5. The defeated Brown army has retired beyond the Avon by way of Amesbury and Salisbury.

6. The Avon is assumed to be wide and unford-

able. There are only four bridges—Upavon, Amesbury, Salisbury, and Fordingbridge—all of which have been destroyed by Brown.

**SPECIAL IDEA: BROWN.**—1. After retiring over the Avon on July 31, the Brown army has concentrated at Cholderton ( $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles east of Amesbury) and to the south of it, and received reinforcements from the north-east.

2. The Brown Commander-in-Chief intends to advance on August 3, and to attack the White troops occupying Old Sarum and Salisbury before the whole White army has crossed the river. A Brown balloon has seen White troops engaged in constructing bridges west of Old Sarum and at Salisbury about 6 p.m. on the 2nd.

3. A part of the Brown reinforcements, consisting of the troops mentioned above, bivouacs at Ludgershall (north-east corner of the Government ground) on the 2nd. This detachment receives orders to attack the White detachment which has crossed at Milston, and to protect the flank and rear of the Brown main body.

**EXECUTION OF THE SCHEME.**—The commander of the White detachment occupied an advanced line on Rabbit Hill—Long Hill with two battalions, these in turn detaching two companies to Clarendon Hill. One battalion was maintained on the line Silk Hill—Brigmerston Field, and another on the position of The Wig. A field battery (less one section—*i.e.*, four guns) was in a position of observation at Rabbit Hill, one battery at Long Hill, and a section at Silk Hill.

The Brown force formed up in the first instance at point 431 (about 1 mile south-west of Ludgershall).

*First Phase.*—The Brown cavalry, after reconnoitring the front, was sent to the right flank. The schoolboys were assigned to the direct attack of the front Rabbit Hill—Long Hill. We watched them

move off from the rendezvous and march briskly up to the crest, and then, deploying in two lines, they advanced by rushes in good style. They wore the same uniform as the rest, but with the slouch hat (*chapeau boer*) instead of the cap. The Territorial division, passing behind Ashdown Copse, moved on Shipton Bellinger, thus executing a wide movement to turn the enemy's right flank.

The schoolboys drove the advanced companies of White from Clarendon Hill, and then methodically, and little by little, gained ground towards the Long Hill position. When the Territorial division had reached the Cross Belt (900 yards east of Rabbit Hill), the right of the defenders executed a counter-attack. This was premature, and having to cross an open glacis under the fire of the Brown guns (posted on the wooded slopes of Ashdown Copse), it would in all probability have been promptly crushed.

*Second Phase.*—The director ordered a quarter of an hour's stand fast, in order to avoid disorder and to allow the defender's advanced line to begin its retirement on Silk Hill.

From this last point one sees the whole of the open ground as far as the crest of Long Hill—Rabbit Hill. The intervening space forms two glacis slopes, the one descending to the Valley of Ninemile River, the other rising thence to the eastward. The passage of the latter [from the advanced position crest to Ninemile River] would have been extremely costly for the assailant had the defender's artillery been in position on Silk Hill. But as it was there were only two guns there, and since the down-slope (from Long Hill—Rabbit Hill) east of the river was too far from Silk Hill to be efficiently beaten by rifle fire, the Brown advance had matters its own way as far as Ninemile River. The Regulars, who fell back fighting from the advanced position [towards Silk

Hill], had also to cross the two glacis slopes; but they had to do so under a very superior fire of guns and rifles, and in such conditions their retreat would have meant disaster.

When the assailant had arrived within about 600 yards of Silk Hill, the defenders counter-attacked to the front, though somewhat raggedly—units one after the other. Like that of the advanced line above referred to, this counter-attack would have been nipped in the bud by the artillery fire of the assailant. An offensive return, as it seems to me, would have been far more to the point than a counter-attack.\*

Meantime the Brown cavalry had passed from the right wing of the attack to the left; but it failed to profit by a superb opportunity that offered itself of taking in flank, in especially favourable conditions, the whole right wing of the defender, which was both thinly manned and unsupported by a natural obstacle or by flanking fire.

At this point the manœuvre closed. It was followed by a long criticism by Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Douglas, and the day ended with a march-past. Before speaking of the latter, I will mention the observations suggested by this most interesting field day.

CRITICISMS OF THE DIRECTOR.—I shall begin with these. They were written out, printed, and distributed to the units concerned. This method cannot be praised too highly. It alone enables a leader to make known his views, to inculcate

\* A *retour offensif* is distinguished from a *contre-attaque* in the French military terminology of to-day. A counter-attack is, roughly, one made from the position to the front of it; an offensive return, one made from the rear of the position towards the position at the moment of, or after, its occupation by the assailant. In the British Service the term "counter-attack" is used indiscriminately for all forms of offensive return by the original defender ("Field Service Regulations," part i., p. 125, etc.).—TR.

a doctrine—to instruct, in the full sense of the word. General de Lacroix\* adopted this judicious procedure after the grand manœuvres of 1907 and 1908, and it is to be regretted that our Generalissimo's critiques were not distributed to every unit; it is the only way of establishing between the directing authority and the executants that close connection which is so essential to success.

The remarks of the director referred chiefly to strategical and tactical combinations. The General approved the southward movement of Brown, which kept the detachment in touch with its main body, and also covered the latter. He remarked also that the frontal attack of the schoolboys was well combined and connected with the main attack on the flank, and only criticized the employment of the cavalry on Brown's right flank during the first phase of the engagement.

On the other side, the General did not conceal his disapprobation of the employment of an artillery advanced line by the White Regulars. The advanced line, he said, ought to have been held only by outposts.

As regards details, he mentioned chiefly the following points: Personal reconnaissance by leaders in all grades is necessary to insure the proper direction of an attack; the smaller units did not always keep sufficiently in touch with the higher leaders; the attacks were made without *ensemble* with the consequence that units became much mixed up; the ground was badly used by the machine guns; the supports were too near the firing line, etc.

All these remarks are very just. They indicate that General Douglas is a leader.

PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS. — Before discussing certain of these criticisms (and, be it said, without the

\* Vice-President of the Higher War Council and Generalissimo of the French Army, 1907-1909.—Tr.

least intention of fault-finding), I must say that we were all astounded at the vastness of the general scheme. This involved strategic combinations which seemed to us to be useless for the instruction of troops who had scarcely felt their feet—who had come down, we thought, to learn the ABC of tactics applied to ground. Greater simplicity would probably have been preferable. Of course it is often necessary to imagine the actual troops (whatever their numbers) as forming part of a larger whole; but it is quite sufficient either (*a*) to suppose the units exercised to be confined on their right and left\* by the presence of other (imaginary) troops, if it be desired to study the [preparatory] frontal engagement and the [decisive] central attack, or (*b*) to place them on the wing of a fictitious main army should the object be the execution of a flank attack. This would minimize the strategic rôle of officers who, by reason of their rank, will probably never have to practise strategy, and allow of greater attention being paid to tactics and to instruction.

In the attack the British infantry generally advances in two deployed lines, separated by a distance which varies, but is almost always too small, as Sir Charles Douglas remarked. The flanks do not seem to be supported by detachments in rear écheloned slightly outwards. Behind the two lines no troops are to be seen, which gives one an impression of weakness, and it seems as though it would be an easy matter to burst this flimsy curtain at any desired point. In their advance the smallest units, as also single men, use the ground well; but companies do not seem to know how to adapt their formations to take advantage of *covered approaches* to the enemy's position. For instance, we saw

\* The convenient French word *encadré* does not readily allow of translation. A body of troops *encadré* has other bodies right and left of it, and can only move to the front or rear.—Tr.



a central company (*encadré*) advancing deployed in line over open ground, when on its right, within its very own assigned frontage, a well-sheltered ravine led to a clump of trees which would have formed an excellent supporting-point. Instead of closing, moving up the defile under cover, and throwing itself into the clump, the company moved on in line, avoiding the point of support. The company on its right did the same, with the result that the wood remained unoccupied, and an opportunity of advancing 120 yards or so without risk was neglected.

This and similar incidents on both sides—Regular and Territorial—in the course of the fight seem to suggest that the idea of occupying *points of support*, and keeping the intervening bare ground clear of troops but thoroughly swept by fire, is still foreign to the instincts of the British Army. On no occasion did we observe a dash for a supporting-point, and what we have said in this connection is corroborated by some of our compatriots who have watched the Regular Army manœuvres.

The second line, marching deployed—as, for that matter, the Germans and Japanese do—presents an ideal target for guns, while it offers also a very vulnerable surface to the sheet of rifle bullets which pass over the heads of the fighting line and beat the ground in rear along the whole line. How infinitely preferable seem our small section and half-section columns\* that slip so easily into the smallest covered ways! I ask myself, Were not these continuous lines the very cause of the mixing-up criticized by the director?

The counter-attacks of the defence, though not

\* The French company (four sections) is about 250 strong in war, or sixty rifles per section. The section is thus equivalent to the British half-company. The formations alluded to by General Langlois correspond, roughly, to our line of half-companies or sections in fours or file.—TR.

always opportune and well-timed, at least indicate the sharp, aggressive spirit of the British infantry.

The khaki uniforms did not seem to us, on Salisbury Plain, to lessen visibility much when observed through field-glasses. On the other hand, for the individual man in the firing line, a khaki target is indistinct and difficult to aim at. It is therefore advantageous to use khaki in field uniforms.

One thing that struck us most forcibly was the absence of combat patrols. Once the action had begun, we never saw a single one, and I attribute to this cause, amongst others, the inaction of the Brown cavalry in the second phase of the combat. This cavalry, two magnificent squadrons, exceptionally well mounted, was along a line of trees perpendicular to the front, and it had a splendid chance of falling upon the flank of the thin and unbacked lines of the defence. All the spectators feverishly watched for the delivery of a brilliant charge. But none was made. Some officers had, indeed, gone forward a few yards to watch events from the crest behind which the cavalry was covered from view, but patrols would have given quicker and more complete information, and we saw none such.

If the smaller units were ill informed as to what was going on—as the General remarked—the larger ones, on the contrary, were remarkably well connected by all sorts of means of communication—signallers, semaphore, telephones, etc. We might certainly take the British Army as our model in these matters, for it is far in advance of ours.

Returning now to the two questions of grand tactics dealt with by Lieutenant-General Douglas in his critique :

Many people to-day see in “envelopment” the universal panacea of success. Well, considering the great turning movement executed by Brown in order to attack the Long Hill—Rabbit Hill position,

I thought how easy it would have been for the defender, if he had had his forces closed up and in hand, to push a brisk and violent attack, from Long Hill by Clarendon Hill, upon the enemy, who were making the frontal holding attack\* in thin lines and without reserves. It is true that the great numerical superiority of Brown perhaps justified in this case the idea of envelopment, but there are dangers innumerable in attempting to apply this principle unreservedly in cases of equal force on both sides.

The second point to be examined is that of the fully-gunned advanced position of the defence on the heights of Rabbit Hill and Long Hill, nearly two miles in advance of the main position. As the director observed, this measure was unjustifiable. What, in fact, is the function of an advanced artillery position? To put the approaching enemy, particularly his batteries (as they come into line successively), into an awkward, and even dangerous, predicament, and to cause the enemy to make a premature deployment which will render it difficult for him to develop any ulterior manœuvre. But the moment the advanced line has done its work, the moment the opposing infantry arrives within easy rifle range, it ought to vanish as rapidly as possible and rejoin the main body. Further, it is essential that this movement should be able to be completed before the opposing artillery arrives on the vacated position, as otherwise the movement of retreat would be made exceedingly difficult. This condition was not fulfilled in the case we are considering, in which the defender faced eastward, for the distance from Rabbit Hill to Silk Hill is much greater than that from Ashdown Copse to Rabbit Hill, and the Brown side's guns were able to reach

\* *Combat de front* almost invariably means the holding attack. The decisive attack is described as such, even if directed against the front.—TR.

Rabbit Hill while the White advanced troops were still painfully retiring along the long glaxis slopes east of Silk Hill.

If, on the other hand, the defenders had been facing *west*, and their principal line of defence had been Shaw Hill, Tidworth Down, Ashdown Copse, etc., a strong advanced line on the Rabbit Hill—Long Hill position would have forced the assailant to a greatly exposed deployment on the Silk Hill line of heights ; then, when the leading line of the western infantry had reached the bottom of the Ninemile River valley, and begun to mount the slopes beyond, the advanced line would have disappeared suddenly, and with the greatest ease, for it would have had many covered ways to retire by. Clarendon Hill, too, held as an advanced position, would have flanked the main line of defence splendidly. In such a case as this the use of advanced lines would have been perfectly justified, whence it will be seen that it is impossible to give a catchword applicable to all situations. The difference between the conditions of an eastward and a westward defence is still more striking on the ground than it is on the map.

MARCH-PAST.—While the critique was proceeding, the troops formed up for a march-past on a piece of ground admirably suited to the purpose, at the foot of the western slopes of Silk Hill. Here the public enjoyed a fine military spectacle.

The march-past began with the cavalry, who were followed by the artillery, both at the walk. The infantry then went by in open column of companies, first the Regulars, then the schoolboys, and lastly the Territorial division. All marched past very well, especially the schoolboys, which shows that the march-past does not constitute a criterion of the real value of a corps ; for the schoolboys' feelings will not, I hope, be hurt by my saying that as yet their warlike value is not

equal to that of the excellent British regular infantry !

A half-score of boy scouts also took part in the march-past ; their bare legs, khaki breeches, green shirts, and alpenstocks, brought in an original note.

The day ended, we were most kindly and courteously entertained at lunch, in a delightful cottage, by one of the staff officers who accompanied us and his young wife. We shall retain the most pleasant memories of our relations with the officers on Salisbury Plain, which were all too short.

We returned to London that evening.

*Wednesday, August 4.*—We went to Aldershot Camp. The general characteristics of this ground are thus described by the masterly pen of M. Ardouin-Dumazet.

“Aldershot lies about thirty miles south-west from London, in the midst of vast, rough, and sharply undulating plains. These are dotted with sandy hills, and in part the soil has been tamed by pine-plantations. In the low-lying places where the brooks glide, fine oak-clumps, rows of alders, and vigorous ash-trees, combine to form exquisitely scented groves. These ridges, these isolated mamelons, these defiles, are an ideal place for a camp. If the ground-features are not so bold as on Salisbury Plain, they are more varied and less obvious, and the Territorials have here everything that they could desire for the practice of modern manœuvres.”

I give first the effective of the [part of a] Territorial division which we saw at Aldershot [see table on p. 34].

We notice that the war effective of the battalions (1,000 each) was very nearly approached.

The divisional artillery was not present. On the other hand, the division had attached to it, for instruction, wireless telegraph and balloon companies

(in all 575 men, 105 horses, and 11 vehicles) which are "army troops."

These men were stronger and bigger than those we had seen on the previous days. They had the same soldierly bearing, correct turn-out and discipline.

	Men.	Horses.	Machine-Guns.	Vehicles.
4th Battalion, Norfolk ...	772	4	1	—
5th Battalion, Norfolk ...	750	4	1	—
4th Battalion, Suffolk ...	802	9	1	2
5th Battalion, Suffolk ...	738	11	1	2
Transport and Supply Column ... ..	481	114	—	2*
Telegraph Company ...	57	18	—	3
General Hospital, No. 1 ...	40	—	—	—
City of London Sanitary Company, No. 1 ... ..	83	1	—	—
1st Field Ambulance ...	270	21	—	12
2nd Field Ambulance ...	271	40	—	17
3rd Field Ambulance ...	190	18	—	5

The day began with a two-sided manœuvre, the general and special ideas of which were simple and sufficient. Two battalions, attacked by two hostile battalions, carried out a fighting retirement. We were able to watch the engagement from a trench on a hill occupied by part of the retiring force, which formed an excellent lookout. The manœuvre was carried out with entire regularity. It gave rise to the same reflections as that of the day before. Individual men made good use of ground, but units neglected covered ways and supporting-points. The attacking troops moved in two deployed lines and pushed straight before them. For example, a little in front of our view-point a small wood remained unoccupied both by the defender in his retreat and by the assailant later on. It was the

\* Not including vehicles hired for the occasion.

same on the right flank of the defenders. The latter often neglected to secure their hold on clumps of wood that would not only have sheltered them, but would also have enabled them to prepare under cover one or two counter-strokes which would have checked the enemy's advance and cooled his aggressive ardour.

This spectacle reminded me of old days when our own infantry used to fight shy of forests. Nowadays they do not mind marching through woods even in large bodies, and know very well indeed how to make an organized fight in them. Perhaps the British infantry has still to undergo the process of evolution that we passed through thirty years ago. But they will not find it so difficult, for the British soldiers, and the Territorials as well, are very quick to learn the use of ground. In the retreat, too, we saw some companies move from cover to cover in a most sensible fashion.

I watched attentively the method of fire used by the defenders of a trench. Each man individually set his backsight correctly, and never fired except on a definite target and with a careful aim. What was rather wanting was control of the collective fire of the unit. The fire was well delivered and judiciously timed, and was graduated in accordance with the circumstances of each moment; but the men remained at all times with the upper half of their bodies uncovered instead of loading behind cover and rising to fire. The fire unit commanders graduated the intensity of the fire only by regulating the rate or naming the number of rounds to be expended, instead of by increasing and diminishing the number of men employed—these using rapid fire, and the rest keeping under cover.

However, these points of practical detail will be acquired by degrees, and will become petrified into habits; for what is most striking of all is the enormous ascendancy the leaders have over the

men, the keenness of the latter, their eagerness to learn, and the application and earnestness which they throw into all their drill and instruction work. No, this Territorial Army, at any rate its infantry, is *not* a worthless "national guard," but a militia which even now is a factor to be reckoned with.

After the fight we visited part of the administrative troops—the transport and ambulance corps, the personnel of which was under canvas (as were all the Territorial troops). Here the roasting ovens were great rectangular metal receptacles with compartments, and a hearth below. The roasts that came out of them were most appetizing. All the divisional "services" work smoothly without Regular intervention. The medical equipment is complete, even luxurious. The "services" recruit without difficulty from amongst specialist classes, and their further instruction is easy. The results are surprising. With the field ambulances, for example, we found medical men of years and experience, assisted by medical students and attendants from the civil hospitals, all volunteers. The division is, in short, a complete organism, placed in the hands of its leader in time of peace, living its own life—a unit with all necessary cohesion, a real "force."

The care with which the "services" have been organized shows the earnestness, tenacity, and intelligence, that the English have brought to bear in constituting their Territorial divisions.

After our round, we were entertained to lunch at one of the permanent officers' messes of the Regular garrison. The comfort of this establishment was beyond all praise. There was a gigantic lavatory with ultra-modern improvements, a theatre and concert-hall—fitted in the daytime for roller-skating—a bright, spacious, and luxurious dining-room; and outside an immense lawn, scrupulously kept, on which the officers were playing in all sorts



of games. The camp of Aldershot is permanently garrisoned by two divisions—*i.e.*, one-third of the whole [home] army—and furnishes them with everything that could be wished for for daily exercises on varied ground. With a sound doctrine of war, troops so well off should be exceptionally solid and highly trained.

After lunch the general officer commanding the Territorial division sent us to see the “army troops” temporarily placed under his command—the balloon company and the wireless telegraph company. In the first-named, not enough specialists were available in civil life, and Regular instructors had to be called in to undertake the training; but the wireless company is composed wholly of Territorials—officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. We were shown in the balloon factory grounds of Aldershot a small-type dirigible that the British Army possesses. Another of much larger size is under construction.

*Thursday, August 5.*—From early morning we were in the train, bound for Flintshire, north of Chester and six hours by rail from London. All along the line as far as Chester the country-side was remarkably like that of Normandy. Green meadows separated by hedges, many small bouquets of trees, and limited fields of view, make it a country singularly favourable for the step by step defensive, and one in which artillery and cavalry could only play a secondary part. Beyond Chester the terrain is bolder and more open, and wider views are obtained; but the country is still much cut up, and everywhere affords covered ways and supporting-points which a skilful infantry could turn to excellent account.

The [West] Lancashire Territorial Division, with which we were going to pass two days, was encamped by brigades on hired grounds, and worked freely across country under arrangements with the

occupiers, who are compensated for all damage done.

When we arrived, operations had already begun. It was a rearguard action against an assailant who was represented by flags. The general idea did not, as on Salisbury Plain, deal with a real detachment from an imaginary army. Here the division was operating independently against a marked enemy who was supposed to have disembarked on the coast. This general idea had been persistently practised for several days since August 1. The division was retreating by brigade echelons. The action that we were about to watch on the 5th and 6th falls, therefore, into two phases.

When we came on the scene, a brigade on outposts was falling back, and another was about to deploy in support of it. We watched first of all the assembly of the infantry. The battalions are chiefly composed of factory workers from Liverpool and neighbouring places. In many cases they are commanded by the superintendents and directors of their own factories, which gives them a cohesion which was manifest to the observers. One felt that the leaders had great authority over the soldiers, and, as all serve voluntarily, it is safe to say that the *moral* of these troops, like that of the troops we had previously seen, is in all ways excellent.

Here, indeed, is one of the great advantages of voluntary service, that the men join, not from mercenary motives, but because they feel the country's danger. Therein lies a great difference between the Regular Army, which is, when all is said and done, composed of soldiers who are attracted by the pay, and the Territorial, which is composed of volunteers who serve from motives of duty and patriotism. The difference is all to the advantage of the Territorial Army. The standard of technical proficiency is evidently not all that it

might be, but its moral force is greater. This is a factor which is not sufficiently taken into account in discussing the value of this army, controversy turning almost entirely upon the question of numerical strength and on the number of days in the training period, but it is a powerful element of strength which compulsory service would not give.

On this day, the 5th, I particularly followed the movements of a field artillery brigade. The three batteries when we joined them had unlimbered, and taken up a position in observation. When the retirement of the infantry had well begun, the guns left their position to take another more to the rear, and the teams and gun-limbers came up at the trot to join the guns and wagons of the fighting battery. In leaving the position the batteries had to descend a sharp and slippery turf slope, and here the want of training in the horses and the inadequate instruction of the drivers made themselves felt. On the other hand, the gunners of their own accord assisted by putting on the brakes and checking the vehicles with ropes, without even waiting for their non-commissioned officers to tell them to do so. Still several teams stuck, and it was a painful business to get the whole away. To reach the new position, the brigade had to pass by narrow ways with abrupt turns. It managed to do so, however, thanks to the initiative of the gunners and the experience and activity of some of the non-commissioned officers.

- The batteries then came into action on really difficult ground, but artillery that had been trained to manœuvre properly would nevertheless have taken it at the trot. The Territorial brigade acquitted itself creditably, but rather confusedly and with much expenditure of time, the result being that fire had hardly been opened when it was time to fall back again. Rearguard work calls for

high mobility and manœuvring capacity in the artillery, and this the Territorial artillery, as it is constituted at present, can never possess in a sufficient degree.

Once in position, the guns opened fire readily enough, and carried it out correctly; the gun drill left nothing to be desired. Perhaps, however, the rules of fire discipline are too refined to be applied by officers who do not practise them daily. Actually each battery fires a little over 100 rounds annually, which is not sufficient to familiarize officers with time-shrapnel fire. Here is a second difficulty that the Territorial artillery will have to overcome.

After the manœuvre we visited all the camps. What we saw only served to confirm the observations we had made on previous days; but we were able more and more to judge of the happy results of the initiative of the Territorial officers, who are accustomed in civil life to take responsibilities. This initiative manifested itself everywhere. For example, as the division had not sufficient drinking-water available, an apparatus for sterilizing water by heat was installed promptly and without hesitation, the personnel of the division itself furnishing all the necessary resources for its construction and working. As for the expense, no one doubted that the County Association would meet it, because it was money usefully spent. Initiative of this kind can only thrive when it is not choked by a fussy and distrustful administration. How long would it have taken in France to obtain authority to instal a sterilizing apparatus, to buy it, etc.?

Initiative, like *moral*, is a serious element of strength in the British Territorial Army, which seems to possess both in the highest degree.

In one of the camps a Colonel had had a bath of waterproof fabric rigged up, large enough for ten men to swim in. In general, throughout the

camps, everything necessary for the men's washing and bathing was lavishly provided. In all things the county administration is anything but niggardly. It is evidently sought to stimulate recruiting by making the soldiers very comfortable, feeding them plentifully and well (better than, in most cases, they are fed in their own homes), and giving them a high rate of pay. The private soldier receives a shilling a day as pocket-money.

The divisional commander, General Count de Béthune [Major-General E. C. Bethune, C.B.], courteously offered us the hospitality of his headquarters, where we dined and slept. During dinner a touching incident occurred. The General had given orders for the band of one of the Territorial battalions to play the *Marseillaise*, if possible. This improvised band had not the piece in its répertoire, but some of the bandsmen and the drum-major knew the air. It was bravely attacked. When the instruments stopped the men sang, and the cornets caught the notes, so to speak, as they rose. We had never heard the *Marseillaise* so distorted, but it had never thrilled us so much before. The cynic would have sniggered; we, Englishmen and Frenchmen, were profoundly moved.

In conversation we learned from the officers that habits of temperance were becoming strikingly noticeable in all classes of English society. They did not attribute this entirely to the efforts of the societies that exist for the special purpose of combating the drink evil, and it would rather seem as though the habits of the nation itself had undergone a change. In our visits to the canteens we noticed that a good deal of tea and a good deal of milk was being drunk, while in the field the hawkers who followed the troops sold far more fruit—especially bananas—than alcoholic liquors. Lastly, we were told that one battalion which we

were to see next day comprised 90 per cent. of teetotallers.

*Friday, August 6.*—We watched the sequel of yesterday's manœuvre. The three brigades of the division were to carry out rearguard operations, the enemy being still "marked."

I particularly followed the movements of an infantry brigade which, originally placed in reserve, was called on to execute a counter-attack at the moment when another brigade was retiring under pressure of the assailant's advance. It struck me that the assembly formation was rather too much exposed to the view of the enemy, and also in rather too close order, considering the heat. But one must remember that the troops were working over hired grounds, damage to which had to be paid for; and this probably accounts for the position and formation adopted.

The brigade was in touch with the others by telephone, semaphore, and signallers. Each battalion has thirty-two signallers. This means thirty-two fewer rifles in the firing line; but what insurance against false movements, and therefore what economy in human life!

I was anxious to see how the brigade went into action. In due time it moved off. First two small sections or patrols, then the advanced guard, and lastly the main body. But the distance between these bodies was so small that none of them could really have fulfilled its task. The head of the advanced guard deployed into extended order at the very beginning, although the enemy was still at a considerable distance. As a matter of fact, it had to close again almost at once to enter a hollow road, and thenceforward the brigade was not guarded in any way save by the presence in front of it of the other brigade, which was heavily engaged with the enemy. It was the same method that we had seen on the preced-

ing days. Must we conclude that the error is universal?

Later on the brigade had, in order to come into action, to ascend a high and steep hill, which it approached by a narrow lane. The deployment at the outlet of the lane was quick and orderly. The men climbed with surprising agility and fine dash, each section making skilful use of the ground in its successive rushes, and advancing in a way that would have done credit to a good Regular corps.

When the cease-fire was sounded, the brigade re-formed promptly, and marched past us in column of fours without showing the least fatigue or exhaustion, although the heat had been severe enough to cause several (but happily not serious) sun casualties. The equipment of the British infantryman is perfect. No strap cramps the chest. In hot weather the coat is unfastened, and the men breathe easily. A body of fully trained troops in good condition, wearing our equipment, would certainly have been more exhausted by such a day's work than were these youths, many of whom were scarcely eighteen.

After the field day and a final cup of tea in one of the officers' messes, we took the train back to London. It was with regret that we parted with our new comrades, for whom we had a sincere fellow-feeling. We understand by the welcome they gave us that the *entente cordiale* is not merely a diplomatic arrangement, but the manifestation of a deeper feeling that is born of a common danger.

## II.

### THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1909

#### A.—WEAKNESSES OF THE OLD ORGANIZATION.

THE South African War showed that in many respects the military organization of Great Britain was defective. (a) Mobilization was extremely difficult, owing to the absence of organization in the higher units. (b) The numbers were inadequate. "The ideas of the War Office, in case of war, did not go farther than putting in line two army corps, and a cavalry division" (*L'Angleterre et l'Armée Anglaise* by the Swiss Colonel Camille Favre). Consequently it became necessary to call for contingents from the Colonies, which furnished 84,000 men altogether, and also for volunteers of all sorts, [many] of very inferior quality, and liable to fail in the hour of need. (c) The officers were insufficiently educated, and had not studied military history, the never-failing well of instruction. (d) The tactical methods employed were defective and out of date, as was natural in an army unused to annual manœuvres on a large scale and unprovided with a general staff. (e) The moral level was not high, for the rank and file were recruited by voluntary enlistment in the lowest classes of society.

This old organization sufficed while Great Britain and her Colonies were protected, seawards by a fleet greatly superior to that which any two Powers combined could set against it, landwards by natural frontiers, barriers almost impassable for armies owing to want of roads; and also so long as



England was in a position to decline European alliances, with the liabilities they involve.

To-day the situation is profoundly altered. Certain navies are growing with incredible rapidity and threaten British supremacy at sea, and at some moment or other it will happen that the superiority of the British Fleet, given the diversity of the tasks it will have to undertake, will not be unchallengeable.

Moreover, at the present day the colonial frontiers of neighbouring States are traversed by more routes than heretofore. Lastly, England has found it necessary to contract with certain other countries engagements such as may involve her in the complications of a European war. In short, her military situation is completely altered, and necessitates a new and sounder organization of her forces in view of (a) colonial defence, (b) home defence, and (c) armed intervention in a European conflict.

These three purposes should logically be served by—a (so to speak) *Colonial Army* sufficient to provide for the colonial reliefs, and to insure the defence of the Colonies if the need arose; a *Territorial Army*—that is, one that remained permanently in the territory of its origin; and a *National Army* for European warfare. But as this last would be a new and extraordinarily heavy expense, the attempt has been made to do without it, and to assign to the Colonial—*i.e.*, the Regular—Army the third as well as the first of the above-mentioned duties.

This is the basis of the idea of constituting, with a rapidly mobilizable Regular Army, an *Expeditionary Force* available either for the defence of the Colonies, or for the support, if the case arises, of an ally, and of forming out of the old auxiliary forces (in the Colonies as well as in the British Isles) a *Territorial Army* for home defence. At the same time, the

traditional dislike of the nation for the system of universal compulsory service for all citizens has been respected. The task of reform was therefore truly difficult; it has been accomplished with all the success possible under the voluntary system, as Lord Roberts himself, though an advocate of compulsory service, has recognized.

### B.—THE FIRST REFORMS.

Before the Liberal Ministry came into power, various attempts were made to discover the remedy for the defects revealed by the South African War. First of all it was formally laid down as a principle that "the military system should be such as to admit of expansion outside the limits of the regular forces of the Crown."

The first efforts were directed to the better training of the troops for war—*i.e.*, in varied ground. "In this connection the progress made has been most important. Aldershot has been the principal instructional station, and here, since the war, an army corps has been kept in a state of constant fitness by Sir John French, one of the most distinguished of the South African generals. The principal English camps—Aldershot, Salisbury, and the Curragh (Ireland)—which have vast War Department lands, have developed more and more into great training-grounds. Manœuvres, of large and small units alike, have assumed hitherto unheard-of dimensions. In England the law does not permit of troops passing through private estates, but, thanks to the goodwill of the proprietors, this obstacle has been to a certain extent overcome" (Colonel Favre). Thus nearly half of the British Army is permanently stationed in camps, and it is therefore in an exceptionally advantageous situation, compared with all other armies, as regards facilities for true war training on varied ground. With a sound tactical and

strategical doctrine—which the newly-created general staff will infuse into it—the British Army ought in the near future to be one of the very best in the world, if only it takes proper advantage of the favourable training conditions it enjoys; and the significance of the change cannot be overestimated.

Further, great efforts were made to raise the moral qualities of the soldier. This point, though it is often almost ignored in discussing the British Army, I consider of such importance that I propose to give some details of the methods pursued and the results achieved in this regard.

Recruiting being provided for by voluntary engagements and re-engagements, the pay and the various allowances are very high. To give an idea of this, I may mention that after all deductions and stoppages for administration, equipment, washing, etc., the private soldier of the line infantry receives per week, *clear*:

4s. 11d. at eighteen years of age, on enlistment.

7s. 9d. at nineteen, after six months' service.

9s. 5d. or 11s. 1d. after two years' service, according as he is entitled to the higher or lower scale [of proficiency pay].

In addition to this high remuneration there are special allowances for certain posts and for certain supplementary duties. Further, when the soldier is on pass or on furlough, he gets not only his pay and all allowances, but a sum of 6d. daily in lieu of his rations. So the English soldier on home service costs on an average £68 a year.

Certain people in England consider the allowances granted too large—higher than the wages of many working men—but the War Office makes a point of this high pay in order to be sure of good recruits. With the same end in view, it makes every effort, either by co-operating with the powerful civil associations that exist for the purpose, or by the gift of vacant situations under its own control, to

insure employment for the discharged soldier. The results obtained are satisfactory, to judge from the following figures :

	Number of Men discharged with Good Characters.	Number of Men who obtained Employment.	Per Cent.
1905 ... ..	31,321	25,362	81
1906 ... ..	26,193	21,985	85
1907 ... ..	31,044	24,179	77

Of the situations found in these three years, 16·5 per cent. are in public service, 38·9 per cent. in that of the railway companies, and 44·6 per cent., or nearly half, in private establishments. This last figure is a fresh index of the increasing interest in things military shown by the enlightened classes, and of the militarist movement that is manifesting itself in the nation.

Still, 20 per cent. of the men discharged do not find employment immediately on quitting their corps. To remedy this state of things, the Minister of War [Mr. Arnold-Forster] appointed a Commission of Inquiry in 1905, and this Commission recommended that technical education should be given to the soldier during the long period that he spends with the colours, that information should be circulated as to the condition of the labour market, and that employers should be furnished with detailed information as to men discharged from the army. All of these proposals were sanctioned.

The method that has hitherto proved the most satisfactory is that of technical education. The applicability of this is easily understood in the case of a long-service army, though it is not justified in armies where military training has to be carried out at high pressure.

Generally speaking, the soldier himself pays for his own instruction in the branches of technical work he elects to take up.

Thanks to all this, recruiting, which was formerly almost restricted to the "unemployed" of the large towns—as a rule, unpromising material—has notably improved. As regards physique, the authorities are enabled to pick and choose to a greater extent. On the moral side, recruits are now required to produce a certificate of good character and respectability, which was not previously necessary.

The proportion of men who have received primary education before joining their corps has progressively increased from 34 per cent. in 1903 to 41 per cent. in 1904, 47 per cent. in 1905, 52 per cent. in 1906, and 55 per cent. in 1907. The figures for losses caused by physical incapacity, bad conduct, etc., show a constant decrease from 10,002 in 1904 to 9,138 in 1905, 6,603 in 1906, and 5,975 in 1907. The health of the army has in the same time considerably improved. Whereas in Germany the proportion of admissions to hospital is 605, and in France 600 per 1,000, in England it is only 447. The death-rate is 2.92, whereas in France it is 3.10, per 1,000. Further, drunkenness is rapidly diminishing in the Regular as in the Territorial Army, as we discovered for ourselves in the camps of the latter.

In addition to his proverbial steadiness and his perfect discipline, the British soldier now possesses intellectual and moral qualities that have, since the Boer War, most seriously modified and enhanced his intrinsic worth.

Lastly, a thorough transformation has been effected in the clothing and equipment of the British troops. The field equipment is remarkably comfortable; but I shall not go into details on this point, having dealt with it already in connection with the Territorial Army, and must content myself

with saying that as the result of this the troops are more supple, which is far from being an unimportant advantage under the tactical conditions of to-day.

### C.—THE BRITISH ARMY AT THE BEGINNING OF 1907.

Up to 1907 the reforms introduced, important as they were, had not in any way touched the general organization of the forces; these comprised (a) the *Regular Army* and its Reserve, and (b) the *Auxiliary Forces*—Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers.

This army was, and is, the only one in Europe that recruits entirely by voluntary enlistment. The situation of Great Britain, secure from invasion on a large scale, had hitherto permitted her to content herself with a professional army. Moreover, the Regular Army is before all a *Colonial Army*. It has in peace-time to provide the reliefs for the overseas garrisons, and in war-time to undertake colonial expeditions. These special conditions debar it from being recruited by the compulsory system, the application of which has never even been suggested.

As for the Auxiliary Forces, the need of giving them a greater measure of solidity was not felt, and they were merely militias, for which the voluntary enlistments obtained amply sufficed so long as England was able to maintain a policy of "isolation."

The *Regular Army and its Reserve* are destined to provide the reliefs for the colonial garrisons, and to fight wherever they may be required to do so, in or out of Great Britain. The periods of engagements and re-engagements are fixed, not by law, but by decision of the Minister of War, Parliament only intervening to vote, annually, the military expenditure. All engagements are for twelve years, but the division of this period between colour and reserve service varies. The latitude which the Government enjoys in this respect is intended to

facilitate recruiting, by placing it in a situation to deal effectively with the ever-changing conditions of the civil labour market. It allows, also, of augmentations and reductions in the effective of any particular arm or branch of the service, which would be dangerous in a State in which the Government was at all unstable. It permits, lastly, of manipulating the relative proportions of the men with the colours and the reservists. Thus, after the Boer War the duration of colour service in the infantry was reduced to three (and even temporarily to two) years. This considerably augmented the reserve strength, and although the duration of colour service was for some time raised to nine years, the reserve is still over strength as regards infantry. With the seven years' term now in force this surplus of reserves will disappear by degrees. The latitude granted to the War Department in this respect gives the military system an elasticity which compulsory universal service could never give. For example, if a two years' term is sufficient for the infantry, it is too small for the cavalry and artillery, and too much for the departmental and administration troops. It is therefore an economically and financially unsound method of utilizing the country's military resources.

At the present time the duration of service in the different arms in England is fixed as follows :

	With the Colours.	Reserve.
	Years.	Years.
Line Infantry ... ..	7	5
Line Cavalry ... ..	7	5
Horse and Field Artillery ... ..	6	6
Engineers ... ..	2 or 3	10 or 9
Army Service Corps, Transport ...	3	9
Army Service Corps, Supply ...	2	10
Medical Service ... ..	3	9

Recruits are accepted from eighteen to twenty-five years of age. The men are allowed to re-engage to complete twelve years with the colours, and even, if they are non-commissioned officers or holders of certain appointments, to complete twenty.

The Reserve of the active army is divided into four sections. "Section A includes those soldiers who voluntarily undertake during the first year after their discharge from the active army to hold themselves at the disposal of the authorities for expeditions which are not of sufficient importance to justify the general calling out of the Reserves. The number of Section A Reservists is fixed at 5,000, and their daily pay at 1s. 1d. Section B is the ordinary Reserve, and includes all those who have completed their colour service. Pay, 6d. a day. Section C. is composed of men who have been allowed to enter the Reserve before the completion of their colour engagement. Pay as in Section B. Section D comprises men who have completed twelve years' active and reserve service, and re-engage for a further four years' term in the Reserve. Pay as in Section B. Reservists are liable to a twelve days' course of training every year, but in practice they only perform a musketry course" (*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères*).

The Regular Army was formed in higher units, but these units were not provided with their administrative services, and mobilization was therefore a slow and complicated business.

The *Auxiliary Forces* comprised the Militia and the Yeomanry on the one hand, the Volunteers on the other—that is, two distinct categories of unequal value.

In the Militia the term of service was six years, and the limits of age eighteen to twenty-five. The Militiaman's liabilities were a maximum of six months'—in practice usually two months'—recruit training on enlistment, and thereafter twenty-one to



twenty-eight days' annual training, with in addition a course of musketry. The Militia formed 126 battalions of varying strength, each attached to a regiment of the Regular Army; 32 corps or battalions of garrison artillery, 3 field batteries, and 2 engineer battalions.

The Yeomanry formed the cavalry of the Auxiliary Forces. Engagements were for three years, and the limits of age on joining seventeen to thirty-five. In theory Yeomen mounted and equipped themselves. They had to attend twenty drills in the first year and ten in each subsequent year, fourteen days in a camp of instruction, and a musketry course. The Yeomanry consisted of 57 regiments of 4 squadrons each.

The Volunteers could join between the ages of seventeen and thirty-five. There was no definite term of service laid down, and their engagement could be terminated at any time. They formed 226 infantry battalions, attached to regiments of the Regular Army, 68 battalions of garrison artillery, and 35 engineer battalions. The Volunteer had to perform twenty drills in his first year, ten in following years, and six days' camp. For each day in camp the battalion commander drew 2s. 6d. per man, out of which he had to provide the rations, the sum remaining over being paid out to the men as pocket-money.

No member of the Auxiliary Forces could be called upon to serve outside the kingdom without his own consent.

This system had grave defects. There were no organized [higher] units, but only a collection of battalions, each with its own tactical procedure and administrative methods. From this resulted a want of homogeneity and an unduly autonomous spirit, and it was impossible to place this army on a war footing, because it had none of the services necessary to its existence as such, and

was practically entirely wanting in field artillery. Further, there were far too many garrison—*i.e.*, stationary—artillery units, and the territorial distribution of the forces was governed, not by a definite plan, but by the accident of birth, so to speak, corps having come into existence in a spontaneous and irregular fashion. In a word, the Auxiliary Forces did not constitute an army capable of taking the field.

#### D.—MR. HALDANE'S REFORMS.

In spite of the improvements that were introduced in the military system before the advent of the Liberal Ministry to power, "no complete, methodical, and thoroughly thought-out scheme of reform had been tried, or even submitted to Parliament, from the end of the Boer War to the beginning of 1906" (*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères*), the latter date being that at which the War Ministry was entrusted to Mr. Haldane.

A too slavish adherence to tradition had made the British Army an archaic organism, without either homogeneity or capacity for adapting itself to modern realities. Reduced to their simplest form, the military requirements of the country were twofold—exterior and interior. Consequently only two categories of forces were required: a First Line Army for exterior operations, and a Territorial or Second Line Army for the defence of the British Isles.

REGULAR ARMY OR EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.—Owing to changes in the world-politics of England, that Power may be led to undertake operations on the Continent of Europe in concert with an allied or friendly Power. It was therefore necessary first of all so to organize the Regular Army that it could undertake this new rôle, and next to create a Territorial Army capable by itself of defending the home country against any attempt at invasion while the Regular Army was occupied elsewhere.

Hitherto the Regular Army had been of quite sufficient strength to provide all the *combatant* units of an expeditionary force of six infantry and one cavalry division, but the available number of *non-combatants* was far below that required on mobilization. Now, as in a European conflict rapidity of mobilization is of capital importance, it was necessary to take steps to reduce the time required for this process, by properly organizing all the auxiliary branches of the new Expeditionary Army. The Minister's opinion was that these branches, and certain others, such as ammunition columns, might, largely at any rate, be formed, not from soldiers of the active army (who, as we have seen above, are most costly) but from less valuable and less highly trained men—that is, on a more economical system. “For reasons of expense, this transformation was accompanied by certain reductions in the effectives, for which Mr. Haldane was sharply criticized. Amongst these measures, that which excited the greatest opposition was the suppression of eight line infantry battalions, which involved also that of the Reservists of these corps” (*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères*).

It must be observed that the suppression of a few battalions does not in the least modify the composition of the Expeditionary Force ; it only affects the strength of Regular units remaining at home after the departure of the divisions sent abroad. The advantages of having the departmental services organized in time of peace largely compensates for such reductions in the units remaining at home, especially with a Territorial Army solidly organized.

The question of organization having been thus solved, the next requirement was the constitution of a strong Reserve for the Regular Army. The numbers of this were fixed in accordance with the presumed wastage of a six months' campaign. It seems that, as regards a European war, this pro-

vision is extremely lavish. If the demand were some day to exceed the supply—which could hardly happen except in a colonial war of the character of that in South Africa—recourse would be had to the good-will of the Territorials, who after six months' training would have become fine soldiers, and of whom a great number would certainly consent to serve abroad, particularly if the struggle was for the preservation of a British Colony.

The Regular Army Reserve being considered numerically insufficient to meet this demand, it was necessary to create another Reserve. The Militia, an "auxiliary" force whose members could not be compelled to serve abroad, was an uncertain resource, and the Minister formed the idea of transforming it into a Special Reserve, in which the terms of enlistment specifically included liability to service abroad in an emergency. In its new form the Militia still preserves some of its former organization, its stations and its method of recruiting; but it is called the *Special Reserve*, and as such is part, no longer of the Auxiliary, but of the Regular forces, with which it is destined to serve in a foreign war.

The Special Reserve was constituted at first of Militiamen who agreed to the new conditions, and afterwards of voluntarily enlisted recruits of eighteen to thirty-five years of age, re-engagements being permitted up to the age of forty. Quite logically it was divided into two categories—the first and more fully trained assigned to the duty of furnishing the reliefs for the combatant troops; the second assigned to the non-combatant branches.

(a) The first category of the Special Reserve supplies all arms except the cavalry, which has no need of it. In this category the obligations of the men are, on enlistment, six months' recruit train-

ing, and annually fourteen days' training and a musketry course. The infantry consists of 101 battalions (instead of 124 of the old Militia), of which 74 are third battalions of their line regiments, and 27 are fourth and fifth battalions [extra Special Reserve], assigned to fortress garrisons, line of communication, and base duties, and also, on the exhaustion of other resources, to find drafts for the field army.

The effective of the battalion is 34 officers (9 of whom belong to the Regular Army) and 537 men (66 of the Regular Army). "On mobilization the Special Reserve battalions receive those men of the corresponding active battalions who are medically unfit, too young, too new to their work, or otherwise debarred from taking the field" (*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères*).

A great proportion of the fortress artillery of the Militia has been transformed into Special Reserve Field Artillery, in order to insure that the various arms are in proper proportion. The Special Reserve artillery finds the ammunition columns, and also drafts for the fighting line. Its training is given in eleven brigades of the active army (of three batteries each), which [are told off as training brigades and] do not form part of the Expeditionary Force. As regards engineers, the Special Reserve only finds railway and siege companies.

(b) The second category of the Special Reserve provides for the non-combatant services—supply and transport (Army Service Corps), medical and veterinary services, postal, etc.

Special Reservists receive while with their corps the same pay as the soldiers of the Regular Army, plus, at the end of the training period, a bounty of £1 10s., and lastly an annual bounty of £4, paid quarterly.

Table B, p. 72, showing the numbers present,

belonging to the various arms and branches of the Regular Army, on January 1, 1909, and also the nominal effective, gives an idea of the actual surpluses and deficits. It will be seen that the Regular Reserve is still markedly deficient as regards field artillery, and, on the other hand, over strong in infantry. Thanks to the elasticity of the British recruiting system, which, as already mentioned, allows the terms of colour service to be adjusted and varied, the gaps in the Regular Reserve will be made good by reducing the term of active service for field artillery and Army Service Corps—at any rate, for a certain number of men. The deficit in the medical service will be covered by the transfer to that branch of a certain proportion of infantry Reservists; a certain number of such are sent every year to Aldershot to undergo a special training for the purpose.

The task of the AUXILIARY FORCES is to oppose with success any hostile attempt at disembarkation on English shores, or, at any rate, to drive into the sea any forces that have been able to effect a landing. These auxiliary forces needed not only numbers, but organization, for organization is not improvised at a moment's warning. The Militia having gone to the Special Reserve, there remained available for home defence the Yeomanry and the Volunteers, who had no sort of organization. Mr. Haldane made out of these the *Territorial Army*, in which, as I have already shown, every unit is solidly constituted. As I have dealt at length with the obligations, recruiting, etc., of the Territorial soldier, I need not refer to them here. This is the vital point of the present War Minister's reforms, and I have already expressed our admiration of the wise system on which the Territorial force has been organized.

OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS.—I shall do no more than remind the reader of the new institution of the

Officers' Training Corps. This is expected to do a good deal to diminish the existing shortage of officers, which is now considerable, and to attract youths of the upper classes to take up the military career (see Table A, p. 71). The British Army is, in fact, passing through a critical period as regards recruitment of officers, and this year the number of candidates for admission to Sandhurst—the St. Cyr of Great Britain—was actually less than the number of vacancies. An officer, whom I questioned as to the causes of this crisis, replied, as nearly as I can remember his words, as follows :

“ British officers are recruited from the upper and wealthier classes of the nation. They have plenty of authority and power of command, great physical endurance and unshakeable courage ; but in time of peace, absorbed by social relations and sport, they were not, in general, accustomed to give much time to study, and left a good deal of the instruction of their men, and practically all interior administration, in the hands of the non-commissioned officers, who, for the matter of that, deserve this confidence, for they are excellent. After the South African War officers were quite rightly called upon to give more time and attention to their work. Some of them did not see the necessity for changes, or would not bring themselves to alter their accustomed ways, and resigned. At Sandhurst more work is demanded than formerly, and this, too, seems to have kept out some good material. But it is only a passing crisis. To overcome it, it will probably be necessary to open the gates wider to candidates coming from the middle and non-moneyed classes. These latter are for the time being rather frightened away by the luxury and the expensive way of living of the officers, whose pay, though high, is insufficient to live on under existing conditions. It will be necessary either to give much higher pay and allowances—which Parliament will not easily be brought to do—

or to alter military manners and customs. There are great and not unjustified hopes that the Officers' Training Corps will open up the military profession to the middle classes, and that in the near future the supply of officers will once more be quite certain. The introduction of young officers of small means will probably contribute materially towards bringing in a simpler way of life in quarters. The present deficit need not cause over-much anxiety. It is no more than temporary."

Lastly, by royal warrant of April 3, 1909, a *special reserve of officers* was created, with the purpose of (1) insuring that units shall on mobilization have their proper strength in officers, and (2) replacing casualties in officers during the course of a campaign. This special reserve of officers is composed of officers retired or resigned from the Regular Army, and of officers directly appointed after undergoing the examinations before mentioned (p. 14). These officers have to attend a period of training and a course of musketry or equitation each year. They are promoted to the rank of Lieutenant after five years' commissioned service, Captains after ten years', and can attain to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. My own opinion is that a measure such as this, for the regular promotion of reserve officers, is justified. Only too often we see in France reserve or Territorial officers whose grey hairs and high civil positions harmonize badly with the modest rank-badges of a Lieutenant.

STAFF.—A smaller reform, yet one that seems to me to be of great importance, has been the separation of staff work into two distinct parts. Each Commander-in-Chief is assisted by two staffs—the "general staff", which is concerned exclusively with matters directly affecting training for war; and the "administrative staff", which has to consider questions of administration and routine matters.

"The General-in-Chief, thus relieved of all matters



of detail and routine, can devote his whole attention to the training of the troops under his command" (*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères*). The general staff, similarly, relieved of almost all office work, can direct all its efforts to attaining the paramount object of war readiness.

England is ahead of us in the application of this wise principle. It has just been accepted in France; but we must set our feet firmly in the new way, and not content ourselves with half-measures.

#### E.—THE IMPERIAL ARMY.

Having described the reforms that have been applied to the British forces proper, I must not omit to mention a far vaster scheme which is beginning to be put into execution, and has as its aim the greater strength and cohesion of all the forces of the British Empire. This is the creation of a homogeneous National Army or *Imperial Army*, to include all the forces of Great Britain and her Colonies, with a supreme *Imperial General Staff* giving the directive impulse to each part of the whole.

"As everyone knows, the British Empire consists of the United Kingdom, the Indian Empire, and a certain number of self-governing States and Crown Colonies. Very few of these overseas possessions have their military forces controlled by the War Minister, and, indeed, the forces of most of them evade control altogether. Moreover, in these various dominions one meets with military organizations that differ from one another and from the military organization of the United Kingdom. . . . This heterogeneity offers great obstacles to any attempt to employ the sum total of these forces for a common object in war.

"The establishment of a uniform peace organization in these different armies and contingents is

out of the question, but it does not seem to be impossible to create in the dominions a war organization resembling that of the forces in the United Kingdom. At lowest, it should be possible to insist that the war organization of units (companies, batteries, squadrons) should be uniform throughout the Empire" (*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères*).

The Army of the Empire had its origin in the Imperial Conference of 1907, and its fundamental basis was settled in the Conference of 1909, as follows: "Without lessening the control exercised by the Government of each dominion over its own forces, these forces should be standardized, and the formations of units, the arrangements for their transport, the pattern of arms used, etc., should conform as nearly as possible to those adopted for the British Army. That is, while the troops of a dominion should be organized in view of the defence of that dominion, they should at the same time be constituted in such a way that, when a great crisis came, they could be mobilized and used for the defence of the Empire at large.

"The result was the determination of a plan of organization for the forces of the Crown in all places, such that without derogation to the autonomy of any dominion, if the dominions desired to take a share in the defence of the Empire at a grave crisis, their forces could be rapidly combined in a homogeneous Imperial Army" (Colonel Septans in *La France Militaire*, February 12 and August 19, 1909).

In each Colony, as in Great Britain, the forces would be divided into two parts, the one assigned to local defence, the other able to be employed abroad in imperial defence—the latter formed on one model throughout. All these measures will take time to develop.

For the co-ordination of efforts, higher direction

is essential. Hitherto the newly-created general staff has only dealt with the army of the Mother Country. But now it is proposed—and the proposal will probably be shortly carried into effect—to constitute an *Imperial General Staff*, recruited from graduates of the existing staff colleges (Camberley in England and Quetta in India), and from those of other war-schools to be created in the different Colonies. The latter would be under the direction of instructional staffs drawn from Camberley, so as to assure uniformity in methods of training and education, staff duties, and doctrine.

If the grandiose scheme of organizing an homogeneous Imperial Army is realized in the future, Great Britain will possess a powerful weapon, albeit one rather defensive than offensive in character, as I shall presently demonstrate. I must now enumerate the armed forces of Great Britain in war-time.

## F.—THE BRITISH ARMY AS IT IS.

### 1. *The Regular Army at Home.*

*Infantry.*—The unit is the regiment, which has two battalions, one at home, the other abroad, the first furnishing drafts for the second. On enlistment the recruits are sent to the depot, where they are smartened up for three months before being sent to join the service battalions. The infantry consists of 73 regiments, in all 157 battalions, of which 83 are in Great Britain. The battalion has 8 companies. Its peace establishment is 800, including 24 officers and 41 non-commissioned officers; its war establishment is 1,024, including 29 officers and 51 non-commissioned officers. Each battalion has a machine-gun section.

Each line battalion can mobilize, in case of war, a company of mounted infantry out of the officers

and men who have undergone a three months' special course at Aldershot.

*Cavalry.*—The cavalry comprises 31 regiments, of which 17 are in Great Britain. The regiment has 3 service squadrons and 1 depot squadron. Its peace establishment is 700, counting in 25 officers and 50 non-commissioned officers; in war it numbers 541 men (in 3 squadrons), 25 officers and 48 non-commissioned officers. Each regiment has a machine-gun.

*Artillery.*—The field artillery includes—28 batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, of which 14 are in England; 150 batteries of Royal Field Artillery, of which 99 (81 of guns and 18 of howitzers) are at home; 6 heavy batteries of 4 guns each, armed with a new model 60-pounder gun.

The Royal Garrison Artillery in Great Britain comprises 3 siege and 34 garrison companies.

*Engineers.*—The Russo-Japanese War has caused Great Britain to make notable and judicious additions to her engineer troops.

The Royal Engineer units serving in Great Britain are—4 mounted detachments; 12 field companies; 3 bridging companies; 10 telegraph companies (2 of these being wireless companies, 1 for service with army headquarters, the other for attachment to the cavalry division); 3 railway companies; 1 balloon company; 1 electric light company: in addition to the fortress companies.

*The Expeditionary Force* is not organized in army corps, which is reasonable under British conditions. It comprises 1 cavalry and 6 infantry divisions.

The cavalry division is formed of 4 brigades of 3 regiments each (36 squadrons), and 4 horse artillery batteries. Each infantry division consists of 2 mounted infantry companies, which do duty as divisional cavalry; 3 infantry brigades, each of 4 battalions (= 12 battalions); 3 brigades of

field artillery (54 guns), 1 brigade of field howitzers (18 howitzers), and 1 heavy battery (4 guns), total artillery, 76 pieces ; 3 companies of engineers. The first line transport (*train de combat*) consists of 3 field ambulances, 4 artillery ammunition columns [forming part of the 4 field artillery brigades], 1 ammunition column for the heavy battery, and 1 divisional ammunition column. Each of these columns carries both artillery and infantry ammunition. The division has at its disposal, further, 2 echelons of supplies—a supply column and a supply park.

Its effective is about 20,000, of whom 16,000 are combatants.

It will be observed that the proportion of artillery is very high—72 guns to 12 battalions, or 6 per battalion. This is the same proportion as in Germany ; while in France we have at most 4 guns per battalion.

*Army Troops\** and *Line of Communication Troops*, the numbers of which are calculated on a lavish scale, complete the ensemble.

The Expeditionary Force is reckoned at 166,000 men. No man is allowed to be included in it if under twenty years of age.

In sum, the Expeditionary Force, able either to reinforce the colonial garrisons or to take part in a European war, consists of 73 battalions, 84 field, horse, and howitzer batteries, and 42 squadrons. After its departure there still remain in Great Britain 10 battalions, 27 field batteries, 8 horse batteries, and 26 squadrons, which would receive—beside untrained men, the sick and unfit—all men under twenty years of age, who nevertheless would be capable of rendering excellent service. These young Englishmen of eighteen to twenty, whom no one seems to reckon at all as part of the nation's

\* The two mounted brigades (protective cavalry) form the principal part of the Army Troops.—Tr.

forces, would defend their national soil energetically enough in case of invasion. How many young Frenchmen, "infants" in law, enlisted and fought their best in 1870!

If the British Army in the Transvaal at times acquitted itself otherwise than bravely, this was almost entirely due to the practically raw elements which had to be sent out in reinforcements. The British soldier continued to merit his reputation for steadiness and bravery. Moreover, since the war, as we have seen, much effort has been expended in further improving him, both intellectually and morally. The officers, too, are now required to give constant attention to their work, and their tactical value must be greatly enhanced thereby. Lastly, the new organization allows of rapid mobilization.

We may therefore reasonably reckon the British Expeditionary Force as an important factor on the side of Britain's ally in a European war.

## 2. *The Territorial Army.*

The field troops of the Territorial Army consist of 14 yeomanry brigades (brigade=3 regiments and 1 battery), and 14 infantry divisions organized exactly as are the regular divisions, except that the batteries are 4-gun instead of 6-gun [and the howitzer brigades of 2 instead of 3 batteries], the total of pieces therefore being 48 instead of 76.

Besides these divisions, the Territorial Army includes Army Troops—2 cavalry regiments, 8 telegraph companies, 1 balloon company—and the coast defence troops—144 Garrison Artillery and 65 Engineer companies.\*

Two of these divisions are in Scotland, the rest

\* General Langlois does not mention the ten cyclist battalions, which also form part of the Army Troops, Territorial Force.—Tr.

in England. Thus, for the defence of the latter a *field* force of at least 240,000 is available.

The manœuvres of this army which we had the good fortune to witness convinced us that the British Territorial infantry is really adequate for the duties which it will have to undertake—repelling an invasion in a country favourable to the defence—and for which it is preparing itself patiently, resolutely, and diligently. Well led by the general officers who command it, and whom we have seen at work, this infantry would certainly be formidable.

We did not see the cavalry, but a British general officer who had much experience of active service assured me that the Yeomanry was an admirable force, and expressed his regrets that we had not had the opportunity of judging for ourselves.

The field artillery is the weak point of the present Territorial organization. It seems impossible to keep it exactly as it is. The direction of time shrapnel fire is too delicate an affair for officers who do not practise it, so to speak, every day of their lives, and, further, it is impossible to train drivers with the few and intermittent drills which Territorials are required to put in.

It is not my business, of course, to solve so delicate a problem, especially as the solution must depend on many factors which I cannot know. Still, it seems to me that one of the following courses would possibly surmount the difficulty :

The assignment to the Territorial Army of new supernumerary batteries of the Regular Army. This would be the best but also the most expensive solution.

A cheaper way would be to limit the Regular personnel to one officer, the battery commander, a few non-commissioned officers as Nos. 1 and coverers, and two-thirds of the drivers. In time the latter could be dispensed with in proportion

as re-engaged Territorials attained the necessary degree of proficiency in driving.

A third solution would be the frank adoption of a *matériel* which did not need complicated rules of fire discipline, and was driven by mechanical power. In this connection I am convinced that a pompom, firing percussion shell of 5 or 6 pounds weight, would be quite sufficient for the tasks that the Territorial field artillery would have to perform. The network of roads, if we may judge by the part of the country with which I am acquainted, would eminently favour motor-driven artillery. This solution would certainly be the most economical.

Lastly, it seems as if the proportion of artillery in the Territorial Army is very high, considering that the invading army could not be abundantly equipped with artillery. Would it not be advisable, then, for home defence to have fewer and better batteries?

It must not be forgotten, however, that, after providing for the Expeditionary Force, the Regular Army has still some twenty-seven field batteries left in England. This is an important nucleus.

### 3. *The Army of the Empire.*

We have seen that steps are being taken to group the whole of the forces of the British Empire in a homogeneous army under the supervision of the Imperial General Staff. According to Mr. Haldane, these forces will comprise (a) a First Line or Regular Army, 6 divisions of the Expeditionary Force in Great Britain and 10 divisions of the Indian Army (which has already fought in China and Africa), or in all 16 divisions of Regulars available for service wherever needed; (b) a Second Line, or Territorial Army, of 14 divisions in Great Britain and 16 in the Colonies—total, 30 divisions. The grand total is therefore 46 divi-



sions, equivalent to 23 army corps. But it must be noted that, supposing the grand project to be realized—which it cannot be save in the more or less distant future—16 divisions only are available for general service. We can therefore safely assume that the armed forces of Great Britain cannot have any pretensions towards territorial aggrandisement. When the need arises, they will be of considerable assistance to a friendly nation; but they have not [in themselves] the offensive capacity to render them dangerous to a Great Power.

I may add that, in view of dealing with colonial expeditions of secondary importance, a seventh mixed division is being organized out of elements furnished by the garrisons of colonies other than India—South Africa, Egypt, Malta, etc. “This seventh division could be utilized in case of need, as its elements will soon be reinforced up to a high [peace] effective” (*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères*). It has not, however, been counted in the above calculations, because the creation of this division has not in any way modified the actual numbers available.

#### G.—CRITICISMS OF MR. HALDANE'S REFORMS.

In the beginning a vigorous and widespread opposition was raised against the projects of Mr. Haldane, but little by little the Press, even on the Opposition side, seems to have frankly accepted them. To-day the almost unanimous opinion is that the present organization gives the maximum obtainable under the voluntary system. The *National Service League*, directed by Lord Roberts, the hero of the Transvaal, having failed to obtain approval of the universal principle even in the House of Lords, it may be assumed that the present system will remain in force for a long time to come.

The objections levelled against it refer principally to the question of numbers, which are alleged to be inadequate as regards officers and men of the Regular Army, Special Reservists, and Territorials alike. The accompanying tables, A, B, C, and D, taken from a memorandum dated May 24, 1909, the figures of which are official, are an answer to the pessimists.

It is beyond question that the officer-corps is seriously deficient (Table A), but there is every reason to hope that the Officers' Training Corps will enable the gaps to be filled in the near future. Indeed, after only six months' existence, the corps in May, 1909, included 16,608 members, of whom 1,500 have presented themselves as candidates for certificates.

The deficit in men liable for service abroad (Table B) only affects certain arms and branches, and measures are being taken to remedy it. On the whole, the effective strength of the Regular Army and its reserves has been notably augmented since 1905, in spite of all assertions to the contrary.

Lastly, the Territorial Army (Table D) is growing steadily, and it is to be expected that its nominal establishment will be attained ere long.

It is undeniable that the menace of an imminent danger, one of such magnitude as to imperil the very existence of Great Britain, has set in motion a current of military enthusiasm throughout the land, and it looks as if the current will continue to flow as long as the danger exists. This danger is Pan-Germanism, the ambitions of which to-day seem to know no bounds.

*See pg. 169 - Before War for a complete list  
"100,000 men"*

**A.—OFFICERS SERVING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND LIABLE TO SERVE  
ABROAD, IN DECEMBER, 1905, AND JANUARY, 1909.**

	December 1, 1905.			January 1, 1909.			
	Active.	Reserve.	Total Available.	Active.	Reserve.	Special Reserve.	Total Available.
Generals and Staffs ...	306	100	406	306	100	—	406
Extra-regimental employment	358	100	458	358	100	—	458
Cavalry ...	437	180	617	437	207	37	681
Royal Horse and Field Artillery	758	62	820	665	75	275	1,015
Royal Garrison Artillery ...	368	85	453	400	105	29	534
Royal Engineers ...	482	27	509	474	33	74	581
Infantry ...	2,316	783	3,009	2,660	1,020	1,530	5,210
Army Service Corps	334	12	346	340	15	—	355
Army Ordnance Corps	146	4	150	159	10	—	169
Royal Army Medical Corps	510	95	605	488	144	31	663
Army Veterinary Corps ...	—	—	—	79	6	—	85
Totals ...	6,015	1,448	7,463	6,366	1,815	1,976	10,157

N.B.—According to *War Establishments*, 1908-09, the total number of officers required for the mobilization of the Expeditionary Force is 5,762, plus 1,619 to replace six months' losses—total, 7,351. Further, a considerable number would be required for the coast defences, for instructional works, depots, staffs, and services in the United Kingdom. The deficit in officers, especially in the subaltern ranks, therefore still remains considerable.

**B.—NUMBER OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN, SERVING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, AVAILABLE BY TERMS OF ENLISTMENT, AGE, AND SERVICE, TO BE SENT ABROAD (AFTER THE USUAL DEDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE)—  
DECEMBER, 1905, JANUARY, 1909, AND NORMAL EFFECTIVE.**

	December, 1905.				January, 1909.				Normal Effective.			
	Regular Army.	Regular Reserve.	Militia Reserve.	Total.	Regular Army.	Regular Reserve.	Special Reserve.	Total.	Regular Army.	Regular Reserve.	Special Reserve.	Total.
Guard Cavalry	1,129	39	—	1,168	995	123	—	1,118	1,022	267	—	1,289
Line Cavalry	7,774	5,750	—	13,524	7,698	6,704	—	14,402	7,111	5,380	—	12,491
Irish Horse	—	—	—	—	—	—	417	417	—	—	730	730
Horse Artillery	2,621	1,195	—	3,816	2,122	1,832	—	3,954	1,862	1,789	—	3,651
Field Artillery	12,481	7,015	—	19,496	11,305	11,727	7,353	30,385	10,775	20,358	4,763	35,896
Garrison Artillery	7,952	4,368	—	12,320	6,533	7,484	817	14,834	6,688	4,373	936	11,997
Engineers	5,697	3,240	—	8,937	5,095	4,274	1,188	10,557	4,900	5,430	847	11,117
Foot Guards	6,437	6,257	—	12,694	5,080	7,650	—	12,730	4,832	7,062	—	11,894
Line Infantry	44,964	54,526	229	99,719	46,053	71,007	40,713	157,773	46,629	56,980	41,374	144,983
Army Service Corps	4,844	3,321	—	8,165	4,863	4,799	—	9,662	4,469	9,407	4,000	17,876
Army Medical Corps	2,620	1,354	—	3,974	1,343	398	—	1,741	2,549	3,967	3,600	10,116
Army Ordnance Corps	1,161	207	—	1,368	2,713	4,167	289	7,169	1,241	791	—	2,032
Army Post Office Corps	—	215	—	215	—	115	—	115	108	27	—	135
Military Mounted Police	98	—	—	98	100	160	—	260	100	160	—	260
Military Foot Police	234	—	—	234	248	15	—	263	248	15	—	263
Veterinary Corps	95	—	—	95	108	27	—	135	—	—	295	295
<b>Totals</b>	<b>98,107</b>	<b>87,487</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>185,823</b>	<b>94,256</b>	<b>120,482</b>	<b>50,777</b>	<b>265,515</b>	<b>92,534</b>	<b>116,006</b>	<b>56,545</b>	<b>265,085</b>

N.B.—The Expeditionary Force requires 168,577 men, according to *War Establishments*, 1908-09, plus 41,427 men to repair the wastage of the first six months—total, 200,004. A considerable number of men, further, are required for coast defence, for permanent staffs of depots, etc., in the United Kingdom. Until the normal effective is reached there will probably be a deficit in certain arms and services—for example, Field Artillery, Army Service Corps, Medical Corps, etc. Provisional measures have been taken to deal with the deficit.

C.—NUMBER OF NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN AT HOME, LIABLE FOR SERVICE ABROAD, IN 1906 AND 1909, INCLUDING MEN WITH LESS THAN ONE YEAR'S SERVICE AND UNDER TWENTY YEARS OF AGE.

THE BRITISH ARMY IN 1909

73

	January 1, 1906.				April 1, 1909.				Increase.
	Regular Army.	Regular Reserve.	Militia Reserve.	Total.	Regular Army.	Regular Reserve.	Special Reserve.	Total.	
Cavalry ... ..	11,486	7,591	—	19,077	11,039	9,616	596	21,251	2,174
Horse and Field Artillery ...	16,262	8,185	—	24,447	16,731	15,194	9,341	41,266	16,819
Garrison Artillery ... ..	10,108	4,965	—	15,073	8,555	8,306	928	17,789	2,716
Engineers ... ..	6,462	3,615	—	10,077	5,900	4,862	1,329	12,091	2,014
Infantry ... ..	68,573	68,956	271	137,800	72,667	88,948	56,001	271,616	79,816
Army Service Corps ... ..	5,571	3,812	—	9,383	5,348	5,211	50	10,609	1,226
Army Ordnance Corps ... ..	1,411	229	—	1,640	1,569	488	—	2,057	417
Medical Corps ... ..	2,934	1,524	—	4,458	2,955	2,478	774	6,207	1,749
Veterinary Corps ... ..	105	—	—	105	111	35	—	146	41
Mounted Military Police ...	108	3	—	111	110	36	—	146	35
Dismounted Military Police	261	8	—	269	270	17	—	287	18
Army Post Office Corps ...	—	198	—	198	—	127	—	127	—
Totals ... ..	123,664	98,703	271	222,638	125,255	135,318	69,019	329,592	107,025

D.—PERSONNEL LIABLE ONLY FOR SERVICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
OCTOBER, 1905, AND APRIL, 1909.

	Militia.		Militia Reserve.		Yeomanry and Volunteers.		Total in 1905.		Territorial Force, 1909.	
	Nominal.	Actual.	Nominal.	Actual.	Nominal.	Actual.	Nominal.	Actual.	Nominal.	Actual.
Honourable Artillery Com-pany	—	—	—	—	45	37	45	37	—	—
{ Officers	—	—	—	—	854	487	854	487	—	—
{ Men	—	—	—	—	1,538	1,224	1,538	1,224	1,345	1,111
Yeomanry	—	—	—	—	25,752	23,587	25,752	23,587	24,864	24,495
Field Artillery	—	—	—	—	—	—	36	11	1,211	899
{ Officers	36	11	—	—	—	—	—	—	33,009	28,488
{ Men	891	251	45	—	891	296	891	296	—	—
Garrison Artillery	523	381	—	—	2,159	1,633	2,632	2,014	466	347
{ Officers	17,376	12,933	525	—	47,599	38,675	64,975	52,133	11,808	8,897
{ Men	114	95	—	—	899	682	1,013	777	590	506
Engineers	2,331	2,148	51	—	20,042	17,297	22,373	19,496	14,848	12,947
Infantry	2,746	1,889	—	—	7,926	6,226	10,672	8,115	5,969	4,730
{ Officers	101,908	69,484	7,019	—	253,422	180,189	355,330	256,692	194,966	161,484
{ Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	322	243
Army Service Corps	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8,619	7,199
Medical Corps	34	19	—	—	212	124	246	143	1,468	1,063
Volunteer Brigade Bearer Companies	1,566	769	17	—	3,758	3,296	5,324	4,082	13,919	11,015
{ Officers	—	—	—	—	138	64	138	64	—	—
{ Men	—	—	—	—	2,806	1,787	2,806	1,787	—	—
Motor Volunteer Corps	—	—	—	—	50	43	50	43	—	—
{ Officers	—	—	—	—	150	103	150	103	—	—
{ Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	196	—
Veterinary Service	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14	—
{ Officers	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
{ Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	3,453	2,395	—	—	12,967	10,033	16,420	12,428	11,267	8,982
{ Officers	124,072	85,585	7,500	7,657	364,383	265,421	485,955	358,663	302,047	254,525
{ Men	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grand total	127,525	87,980	7,500	7,657	367,360	275,454	502,375	371,091	313,314	263,507

### III.

## THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

Now that we are acquainted with the numbers and value of the military forces of Great Britain, it will be easy to answer the double question with which we began our study—Is the *entente cordiale* between France and Great Britain a guarantee of security, for France and for England, in case of a German attack? Debates in both Houses of Parliament, as well as review and newspaper articles innumerable, indicate that German ambitions have given rise to a general feeling of uneasiness.

As far as we ourselves are concerned, the *entente* is only of use to us if England is in a position to send over to the Continent the greater part of her Expeditionary Force in case of war between France and Germany. Now, the United Kingdom is not in a position to make any engagements of this character unless her Territorial Army, with a small fraction of the Regular Army, is strong enough to repel a possible invasion by the Teuton troops.

From the British point of view, the question is, Is the kingdom in danger, unless supported by France, of being invaded by an enemy strong enough to impose pitiless conditions of peace?

The answer to these two questions, therefore, depends on the value, so far as it can be ascertained, of the British forces available for home defence in either contingency.

Nowadays the fear of a German invasion constantly haunts the British mind. It is sometimes pushed to extremes. Lord Roberts, for instance, in his championship of universal service, blackens

the picture. According to him, the Germans can *secretly* assemble 150,000 to 200,000 men in the neighbourhood of their ports of embarkation without waiting to mobilize, embark them, evade the British fleets, and disembark by surprise on the English coast. But unless the British fleet is too far away for prompt action, or beaten, how will this army be supplied in a country in which it cannot find the required supplies for itself? For the descent to succeed, it would be necessary that the invading army should remain in unbroken communication with the Continent during the whole duration of the enterprise—*i.e.*, for some weeks at least. Some have gone beyond Lord Roberts; for instance, one noble lord asserted that, owing to the dirigible, Great Britain is no longer an island, and runs the same risks as a Continental Power. This is pure fancy. Germany could throw a million of men on to our frontier in a few weeks, but could she ever, with the most perfect dirigibles and aeroplanes, carry over this number of men, with all the *matériel* necessary for so large an effective, into the British Isles? Certainly not! England remains, and will long, if not indeed always, remain, an insular Power proof against invasion *en masse*.

Does this mean that the kingdom is proof against any dangerous invasion? No. But I think that there is danger for her only if she remains isolated and without European allies. If, for example, in consequence of colonial troubles or a Russian menace on the Indian frontier, the Regular army and the fleet was drawn away from the home country (which is the disquieting and not impossible eventuality that was discussed in the House of Lords), then Germany, having command of the sea for the necessary time, could easily disembark, not merely 150,000 good troops, but (in several trips) many more, overthrow the forces left to guard the kingdom, and dictate terms of peace in



London. Lord Curzon himself said in the House of Lords on July 12 last: "An enemy who was master of the capital would be able to fix the indemnity at what figure he thought fit, to impose the conditions he pleased, to destroy our docks and arsenals, and to prevent for ever the development of our fleet." This picture is by no means exaggerated.

The situation of Great Britain would be quite as bad if France were vanquished in a great Continental war. Then Germany, mistress of all the ports she covets on the North Sea, would become a first-class naval Power, against whom England could no longer compete with success.

It is understandable, then, that for our neighbours over the Channel an *entente* with France is absolutely necessary, for it removes all serious fear of invasion, as I shall now show. Allied with France, and consequently with Russia, England has nothing to fear as regards her Colonies, except internal disturbances that can easily be dealt with by the active and territorial forces on the spot. She can concentrate all her naval force in the North Sea, with our own navy in support, and beat the German Fleet.

But take the worst case. Suppose the British Fleet beaten by that of the Germans. Suppose that the latter can then transport 150,000 to 200,000 men to the English coast, and keep them constantly provisioned for some weeks. Is it reasonable to suppose that our opponents will, in order to make a diversion which could not have an immediate result, weaken their forces on the French frontier, where the real decision lies? This would be a grave error, and they are too deeply imbued with the idea of concentration of force to commit it. If they *did*, their probable defeat on the Continent would be a heavy price indeed to pay for a problematical and ephemeral success on British

soil. And would they, as a matter of fact, obtain this local success? It is very improbable.

All the active troops of Germany being necessarily employed on the Franco-German frontier, the invasionary corps directed against England would only be composed of *Landwehr*. Allow the latter an effective of 200,000, which is obviously an extreme figure, they would have against them the fourteen Territorial divisions, and probably one Regular division, besides a part of the garrisons of the fortresses which could be set free when the point of disembarkation was no longer doubtful. These forces would amount to more than 330,000 men, provided with a numerous and excellent cavalry and (when the Territorial artillery has been placed on a sound footing) a relatively powerful artillery force.

The invaders' objective being necessarily London, the best procedure for the defenders is to put themselves, *closely concentrated*, between the enemy and that place. I cannot too strongly emphasize the word *concentrated*, because the idea of concentration of effort has not as yet, it appears, sufficiently penetrated all military circles in England.

Now, the intersected country of Great Britain is very favourable to the defensive. Its utilization by the assailant calls for a degree of initiative and intelligence which the German soldier does not possess. Moreover, their numerical inferiority on this theatre of war will not permit the Germans to bring off their beloved enveloping attack, while along the front they will have to fight their way laboriously over ground covered with hedges and clumps, to which they are not at all accustomed. In such conditions there is a strong probability that the invaders would either be driven into the sea, or else would progress so slowly that the issue of the campaign would have been decided on the Continent before they reached their objective.

In case, therefore, of a conflict between France and Germany, with their respective allies, an

invasion of England is not at all to be feared ; the Territorial Force with one Regular division will *most amply* suffice for any emergency, even without the fleet. Our friends can therefore, without running any risk, send us five divisions, which would be a very important asset in the great battle. The decision will be fought out on the Franco-German frontier. It is there that the maximum of forces must be grouped, and any diversion is dangerous for the party which attempts it.

According to Colonel Repington, a supporter of Mr. Haldane's reforms, the *whole* Expeditionary Force is "capable both of succouring distant possessions and of supporting, if need be, the friends or allies of Great Britain." He even adds : "An idea exists that we must keep two of our Regular divisions in the country. This idea must be absolutely rejected, for it leaves our field army too small to intervene efficaciously overseas, and consequently reduces the value of our friendship and the importance of our hostility."

Still, let us count on five divisions—equivalent to more than two army corps—solid, perfectly equipped and armed, remarkably well organized, abundantly provided with artillery, and commanded, probably, by the English General who enjoys the highest reputation, not only in England, but in the whole world.

The *timely* arrival of such a reinforcement on our threatened left flank would gravely compromise the German right wing. If the latter had violated Belgian neutrality by traversing the district south of Namur and Liège, it is probable that British intervention would stimulate as well the Belgian Army, which otherwise would remain immobile in its fortified refuge of Antwerp.

But the advantages that we may expect to derive from our understanding with our friends over the Channel are no more than illusory unless the Expeditionary Force lands in France in good time—

that is, in time to take part in the great battle which, most military students are agreed, will be *decisive*. Now, this decisive battle may begin as soon as the German mobilization is finished, which will be the fifteenth day after the declaration of war, perhaps earlier. To be able to take part in this grand and terrible conflict, the British contingent will have to disembark at latest on the fifteenth day. Hence the importance of its being able to mobilize rapidly—as its present organization indeed allows it to do—and the necessity of embarking the instant the mobilization is completed.

Now, the Territorial Army is supposed to be called out in the month following the calling up of the reserves of the Regular Army. Will England consent to be deprived of all local defence for a month? Or, on the contrary, will she be able to mobilize the Territorials at the same time as the rest? The whole question resides in this.

To conclude—

(a) The *entente* between England and France is advantageous to the latter, but on the express condition that the British Expeditionary Force can be landed on our coast on or before the fifteenth day of mobilization. Otherwise it will be too late, unless the great battle is prolonged or delayed beyond the time calculated by our strategists.

(b) The *entente* is more advantageous to Great Britain than to us, in that it places the British Isles out of reach of all serious danger from Germany.

The two peoples well understand by now that it is to their common advantage to go forward hand in hand, and thus to oppose an insurmountable barrier to Pan-Germanism. The *entente* has in no sense an offensive character. Far from menacing anybody, it is a pledge of peace. And who, understanding it so, would desire its rejection?



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY,  
BERKELEY

**THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE  
STAMPED BELOW**

Books not returned on time are subject to a fine of  
50c per volume after the third day overdue, increasing  
to \$1.00 per volume after the sixth day. Books not in  
demand may be renewed if application is made before  
expiration of loan period.

OCT 16 1930

NOV 1 1930

5 DEC '37 HJ

REC'D LD

FEB 3 1958

21 Feb 58 RK

REC'D LD

MAY 27 1958

50m-7,'29

Gaylord Bros.  
Makers  
Syracuse, N. Y.  
PAT. JAN. 21, 1908

UA 647

L18

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

